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OBJECTS OF CONTROVERSY: THE
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHT TO
REPATRIATION
STEVEN PLATZMAN
INTRODUCTION
Before the arrival of the European colonists, Native American cul-
ture dominated the North American continent.' As the dominion of
the European settlers expanded westward, friction intensified be-
tween the Native American population and the invading foreign
peoples.2 The settlers wished to cultivate ihe land and fulfill the
manifest destiny of the American nation.3 The Native Americans,
on the other hand, wanted to retain the land and develop their cul-
tural heritage.4 Inevitably, the increased tension led to armed con-
flicts. 5 Throughout the nineteenth century, the European colonists
1. See F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 139-40 (1962)
(stating that difficulties faced by United States government in formation of Indian policy grew
out of fact that Native Americans were in North America when Europeans arrived and their
presence formed an obstacle to advancement of settlers moving westward); see also W. COFFER,
PHOENIX: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE iii, iv (1979) (observing that di-
verse and complex Native American societies existed throughout Americas, with one million
Native Americans speaking more than 300 languages inhabiting area that is now United
States).
2. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 188-89 (noting that settlers and Native Americans
confronted each other on American frontier and committed numerous violations of individual
rights including frequent murders and robberies).
3. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 143 (stating that settlers were disinterested in legal
theory of preemptive rights,jus gentium, rather, settlers saw Indians' rich lands and wanted to
claim land as their own). Prucha also highlights a letter from John Sevier toJames Ore dated
May 12, 1798 that notes the settlers' interest in cultivating the frontier. 1d; see also F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 74 (1982 ed.) (noting that rapid growth of nation by 1880
created demand for territorial expansion and extinguishment of native land title).
4. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 139 (commenting that conflict between whites and
Native Americans was basically conflict over land and that land outweighed all other consider-
ations in white/Native American Indian relations); see also Abel, The History of Events Resulting in
Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi, 1 ANN. REP. AM. HIsT. A. 235, 337 (1906) (citing
Journal of Proceedings at Broken Arrow on Dec. 7, 1824) (quoting statement of Creek chief
rejecting proposed relocation, based on belief that "ruin is the almost inevitable consequence
of a removal beyond the Mississippi").
5. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that innumerable violations of personal
and property rights occurred when white and red races met on American frontier); H. JACK-
SON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR 339 (1881 & photo. reprint 1965).
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systematically eliminated Native American resistance, uprooted
whole nations, and virtually destroyed the indigenous culture. 6 The
turbulence of the time period and the subjugation of the Native
American populace resulted in the loss of four distinct types of cul-
tural objects: (1) associated funerary objects: items believed to have
been placed with individual human remains as part of death rites or
ceremonies; (2) unassociated funerary objects: property related to
death rites or ceremonies that can be proven, by a preponderance of
the evidence, to have been removed from specific burial sites of a
particular Indian tribe; (3) sacred objects: specific ceremonial ob-
jects which are required by traditional Native American religious
leaders and present day religious adherents for the practice of tradi-
tional Native American religions; and (4) objects of cultural patri-
mony: objects having continuing historical, traditional, and cultural
importance central to Native American culture and whose inherent
qualities make the items inalienable communal property. 7 Although
The history of the white man's connection with the Indians is a sickening record of
murder, outrage, robbery, and wrongs committed by the former, as a rule, and occa-
sional savage outbreaks and unspeakably barbarous deeds ofretaliation by the latter,
as the exception.
Jd; see also F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 78 (discussing military campaign led by AndrewJackson
against Creek Indians, which ultimately led to defeat of Creeks and forfeiture of one-half of all
Creek territory).
6. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 213 (noting that peaceful coexistence of Indian and
European cultures was impossible in minds of those who created government policy). Prucha
provides a letter dated September 29, 1818 from Secretary of War Calhoun to the Creek
agent stating the intention of the United States government to eradicate Native American
culture and to force upon Native Americans the ways of "civilized" life. Id; see also F. COHEN,
supra note 3, at 79 (noting that over thirty years following the War of 1812, Indian treaty
making was directed toward removing tribes to western territory in order to create vast areas
for white settlement and minimize sovereignty conflicts arising from presence of Indian na-
tions within state boundaries). Over substantial opposition, Congress passed the Indian Re-
moval Act on May 28, 1830, authorizing the President to exchange territory west of the
Mississippi River for eastern tribal lands. Id at 81. See generally R. BERKHOFER, JR., THE
WHrrE MAN'S INDIAN 134-45 (1978) (discussing theories and images of American Indians un-
derlying United States Indian policy from its colonial foundations to modem period); G.
FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 269 (new ed. 1953) (exploring removal of Choctaw, Creek, Chick-
asow, Cherokee, and Seminole tribes); H. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 26 (documenting broken
promises, inconsistent policies, massacres, and other atrocities by United States in treatment
of Native Americans and effect on particular tribes, including Delaware, Cheyenne, Sioux, and
Cherokee); S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 32-43 (1973) (tracing history of United
States Indian policy from Spanish roots through early 1970s).
7. See Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601,
§ 2, 104 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001) (defining associated
funerary objects, unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patri-
mony). The Act provides that:
(3) "cultural items" means human remains and-
(A) "associated funerary objects" which shall mean objects that, as a part of the
death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to have been
placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later,
and both the human remains and associated funerary objects are presently in
the possession or control of a Federal agency or museum, except that other
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the twentieth century witnessed a cessation of the armed conflict
and an amelioration of the American population's attitude toward
Native Americans, the loss of Native American cultural property
continues.8
The Native American cultural objects exhibited and stored in mu-
seums are of vital importance to the Native American community.
Many of these artifacts are integral elements of religious ceremo-
nies. 9 Without these items, adherents of traditional Native Ameri-
items exclusively made for burial purposes or to contain human remains
shall be considered as associated funerary objects.
(B) "unassociated funerary objects" which shall mean objects that, as a part of
the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to have been
placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later,
where the remains are not in the possession or control of the Federal agency
or museum and the objects can be identified by a preponderance of the evi-
dence as related to specific individuals or families or to known human re-
mains or, by a preponderance of the evidence as having been removed from
a specific burial site of an individual culturally affiliated with a particular In-
dian tribe,
(C) "sacred objects" which shall mean specific ceremonial objects which are
needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of
traditional Native American religions by their present day adherents, and
(D) "cultural patrimony" which shall mean an object having ongoing historical,
traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or
culture itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native American,
and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any
individual regardless of whether or not the individual is a member of the
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall have
been considered inalienable by such Native American group at the time the
object was separated from such group.
Id.; see also Native American Grave and Burial Protection Act (Repatriation); Native American Repatria-
tion of Cultural Patrimony Act; and Heard Museum Report: Hearings on S. 1021 and S. 1980 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings] (statement of Walter Echo-Hawk, Native American Rights Fund) (citing D. COLE, CAP-
TURED HERITAGE: THE SCRAMBLE FOR NORTHWEST COAST ARTIFACTS 286-311 (1985)).
During the half-century or so after 1875, a staggering quantity of material, both secu-
lar and sacred-from spindle whorls to soul-catchers-left the hands of their native
creators and users for the private and public collections of the European world. The
scramble ... was pursued sometimes with respect, occasionally with rapacity, often
with avarice. By the time it ended there was more Kwakiutl material in Milwaukee
than in Mamalillikulla, more Salish pieces in Cambridge than in Comox. The city of
Washington contained more Northwest Coast material than the state of Washington
and New York City probably housed more British Columbian material than British
Columbia itself.
In retrospect it is clear that the goods flowed irreversibly from native hands to Euro-
American ones until little was left in possession of the descendants who had in-
vented, made, and used them.
Id.
8. See infra notes 132-33 (discussing activity of pothunters and development of multi-
million dollar industry for Native American artifacts).
9. See Note, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums-A Battle for Artifacts,
7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 125, 125-27 (1979) (explaining that religion pervades every aspect of
Native American life, and cultural items, such as objects of art, can rarely be separated from
Native American religion). Chief Oren Lyons of the Onondaga reiterates that religion and
Native American cultural objects are intertwined. Id. (citing Arts Advoc.,Jan. 1975, at 2, col.
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can religions find it impossible to exercise their ceremonial rites. 10
The failure to perform these rituals rips at the fabric of Native
American culture and inevitably leads to the destruction of the cul-
tural integrity of individual Native American societal groups."1 Fur-
4). "Religion, as it has been and is still practiced today on the reservation, permeates all
aspects of tribal society. The language makes no distinction between religion, government, or
law. Tribal customs and religious ordinances are synonymous. All aspects of life are tied in to
one totality." Id. Lee Lyons, a member of the Onondaga Nation, in his testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, further established the interrelationship of Native
American society, cultural items, artifacts, and religion. American Indian Religious Freedom Act:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 115-16
(1978) (statement of Lee Lyons, member of the Onondaga Nation). He stated, for example,
that the wampum represents the Iroquois' way of life, religion, culture, and language. Id.
Tribal members of the Iroquois Nation's Onondaga tribe assembled belts from purple and
white clam and conch shells during the late sixteenth century. See A. MOLLOY, WAMPuM 18-25
(1977) (observing that metal drills, "muxes," introduced by Dutch traders, allowed expanded
production of more decorative beads and that increased quality of beads fostered use of Iro-
quois wampum as commodity in fur trade); N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1971, at 44, col. 5 (com-
menting that wampum belts are necessary for religious services in honor of planting, harvest,
midwinter, and summer festival of green corn). These belts are an integral part of the culture,
for symbols woven into the belts constitute the Onondagas' only recorded history. Arts Ad-
voc., Jan. 1975, at 1, col. 1. In addition, Chief Irving Powless has referred to the wampum
belts as "our religion and law combined." N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1971, at 44, col. 6.
In 1899, the Iroquois Nation lost a court battle against the New York State Museum at
Albany for the possession of twenty-six wampum belts. Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 29
Misc. 428, 433-34, 61 N.Y.S. 1027, 1032-33 (Sup. Ct. 1899), aft'd, 53 A.D. 561, 65 N.Y.S.2d
1014 (App. Div. 1900), aff'd, 169 N.Y. 584, 62 N.E. 1098 (1901), appeal dismissed on other
grounds, 189 U.S. 306 (1903). The Iroquois continually demanded the return of the wampum.
Note, supra, at 126. Under pressure from the public, the New York State legislature passed an
act providing for the return of five of the wampum belts to the Onondaga. N.Y. INDIAN LAW
§ 27 (McKinney 1899).
10. See American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the Select Comm, on
Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1978) (statement of Sen. Abourezk, Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs). The Senator explained that Native Americans
imbue religious significance into objects. Id. at 4. Because they are sacred, these objects have
powers that are necessary to exercise religious rites. Id. Thus, the objects are also necessary
for religious survival and the maintenance of the cultural integrity of the Native American
peoples. Id
11. Id. The Hopi Indians are an excellent example of a Native American society deeply
affected by the loss of religious objects. Goodwin, Raiders of the Sacred Sites, N.Y. Times, Dec.
7, 1986, at 65, col. 1 (discussing threat to way of life of 9,000 member Hopi tribe resulting
from inability to worship due to theft of sacred masks); A Way of Life Stolen with Hopi Treasures,
Chi. Tribune, Mar. 25, 1985, at 1, Zone C (reporting on lost Hopi religious masks). The
article quoted Neilson Honyaktewa, high priest of Soyal religious society, as stating, "Without
our religion, we have nothing to live up to. Without our masks, the religion will die." More
specifically, the sacred objects alluded to by the high priest are collectively called "talatumsi"
or Dawn Woman. McDonald, The Long Night of Dawn Woman, Dallas Morning News, June 10,
1990, § F, at 13, col. 1. The talatumsi are made from cottonwood roots with small faces
painted on the ends. Id. at 13, col. 2. The talatumsi are part of the "Wuwuchim" ceremony, a
sixteen day rite of passage that marks the beginning of a young man's education in Hopi
customs. Id. The ceremony dates back in some form approximately 400 years. Id.
Since the disappearance of the talatumsi, young men, discouraged because they cannot fully
participate in all religious ceremonies until they are initiated, have drifted away from Hopi
tradition. Chi. Tribune, supra, at 1, Zone C. Furthermore, a whole generation of men is being
passed by, uninitiated in the Hopi religious ceremonies. McDonald, supra, at 13, col. 1. The
most drastic scenario, but one that is entirely possible, is the end of Hopi ceremonial culture,
nothing less than the death of an ancient culture. Id.
The destruction of the Hopi ceremonial culture is evidenced by the decline in religious
520
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thermore, many Native Americans believe that an elemental
connection exists between these objects and the societal health of
the Native American population.1 2 Even if the evidence connecting
Native American social problems with the repatriation issue were
inconclusive, it is clear that the loss of their property inflicts deep
distress and anguish on the Native American community.13 Finally,
Native American leaders argue that until the cultural objects pos-
sessed by the museum community are repatriated to the appropriate
descendants, the efforts of tribal governments to provide for their
people and remedy the afflictions of twentieth-century society are
doomed to failure. 14
For decades, individual Native Americans, tribal groups, and their
third-party representatives demanded the repatriation 5 of Native
American cultural property. 16 For the most part, the United States
observance. Chi. Tribune, supra, at 1, Zone C. Each of the 12 Hopi villages should have 7
religious societies, each with its own sacred masks and artifacts. Id. Only three villages, how-
ever, continue to have religious societies. Id.
12. Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act: Hearings on H.R. 5237 Before the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 100-04 (1990) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (statement of Arlouine Gay Kingman, Executive Director, National Congress
of American Indians); id, at 112-15 (statement of Michael S. Haney, Chairman, Repatriation
Committee of the United Indian Nations in Oklahoma). The leaders of the United Indian
Nations in Oklahoma link their peoples' high alcoholism rate, soaring suicide rate, poor
health rate, low educational achievement rate, and overall bleak economy to the current state
of their Native American remains. Id. It is their belief that until the situation is remedied, the
Native American population will continue to experience acutely the social ills of American
society. Id.
13. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 370-72 (statement of Suzan Shown Harjo, President
and Executive Director, Morning Star Foundation); id. at 53-61 (statement of Norbert Hill,
Executive Director, American Indian Science and Engineering Society); id. at 47-48 (state-
ment of Thomas R. White, Governor, Gila River Indian Community); see House Hearings, supra
note 12, at 125 (statement of Councilman Patrick Lefthand, the Confederated Salish and Koo-
tenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation) (stating that commerce in Native American artifacts is
abhorrent to Native Americans, and protection of funerary and sacred objects is critical to
well-being of Native American culture).
14. House Hearings, supra note 12, at 112-15 (statement of Michael S. Haney, Chairman,
Repatriation Committee of the United Indian Nations in Oklahoma).
15. See 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 632 (2d ed. 1989) (defining repatriation as re-
turn or restoration to one's own country).
16. H.R. REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990) (observing that, for many years,
Indian Tribes have attempted to have remains and funerary objects of ancestors returned); see
Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 29 Misc. 428, 429, 61 N.Y.S. 1027, 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (pro-
viding historical example of Native American efforts to recover artifacts within possession of
museum). The litigation involved a dispute between the Onondaga Nation andJohn Thacher,
the mayor of Albany, New York. Id. In the ensuing court battle the Indians failed to reclaim
their wampum. Id at 433, 61 N.Y.S. at 1032. Due to public pressure and continuing demands
made by the Onondaga Nation, however, the wampum belts were conditionally returned to
the tribe in 1971. Note, supra note 9, at 126.
Walter Echo-Hawk, attorney for the Native American Rights Fund, notes that in the area of
federal Indian law, courts have traditionally distinguished individual from communal prop-
erty. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights v. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal Interests
in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437, 442-43 (1986). The wam-
pum belts at issue in Onondaga Nation v. Thacher are the paradigmatic example of communal
property. Id. at 443-44. Where tribal law indicates that the individual Native American has
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Government and the museum community ignored their pleas and
refused to negotiate the repatriation issue.' 7 Recently, the debate
between the Native Americans and the museums concerning the re-
no title to communal property, the individual Native American has no authority to alienate
such property. l at 444. Accordingly, in such situations where an individual Native Ameri-
can has alienated communal property, tribal groups would have a greater chance of recover-
ing the lost artifacts.
17. See FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, AMERI-
CAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 78 (1979) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RE-
PORT] (noting failure of museums and agencies to respond to Native American claims
concerning sacred objects); see also Note, supra note 9, at 125 (commenting on reluctance of
museums to return Indian artifacts); Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 181 nn.8 & 9 (discussing
problems faced by Larsen Bay Villagers and Pawnee tribe in recovering cultural items). As
museums did not face sanctions from the Federal Government or the judiciary, they had no
motivation to initiate the repatriation process. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra, at 78. The
Native Americans depended upon the good will and benevolence of the museums for the
return of cultural artifacts, but this good will was seldom exhibited. See infra note 32 and
accompanying text (noting that Native Americans were subject to whim of museums during
nineteenth century).
Generally, Native Americans have had only limited success in negotiating the return of two
types of items. First, most attempts to reacquire cultural items have been unsuccessful even
though cultural items are considered objects of inalienable cultural patrimony. See Note, supra
note 9, at 125 (stating that museums have often ignored formal, nonlegal requests for the
return of relics, relying on legal and practical grounds); supra note 7 (defining cultural patri-
mony). A leading example of a reacquired object of inalienable cultural patrimony is the
Iroquois wampum belts. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing wampum belts
and their significance to Iroquois Nation); Note, supra note 9, at 132 (noting that despite
wampum belt's obvious classification as inalienable communal property it took more than
seventy-five years to regain possession of item).
A second class of objects that has proved difficult to reacquire are those taken from Indian
tribes illegally despite the existence of specific evidence, such as written documentation, of a
tribe's ownership and the museum's illegal acquisition. Suro, Zunis' Effort May Alter Views on
Indian Artifacts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 1. An example illustrating this sce-
nario is the Zuni war god stored in the Denver Art Museum. Id
The Zuni tribe's efforts to recover its war god is perhaps the most publicized example of
fruitful Native American negotiation. See Suro, supra, at 1, col. 1 (stating that nationwide cam-
paign by Zunis has been most successful of Native American efforts to regain artifacts and
human remains); Ball, Zuni Indian War Gods Left to Decay At Secret Shrine, Daily Tel., Aug. 14,
1990, at 10, col. 8 (discussing success of Zuni legal battles and persuasive efforts to obtain
return of war gods). Zuni war gods are wooden pole-like carvings, often adorned with eagle
feathers. Note, supra note 9, at 127. They stand two to three feet tall, austere and cylindrical,
with rounded heads and sharp, stark painted faces. Ball, supra, at 10, col. 8.
The tradition of creating the war gods, or A'hayuta, is performed by members of the Deer
and Bear clans. Note, supra note 9, at 126-27 (citing 47 U.S. BUREAU OF ETHNOLOGY ANN. REP.
64, 526 (1932)). The carving occurs at an annual ceremony held at the winter solstice; others
are made on rare special occasions. a; Suro, supra, at 1, col. 1. After the ceremonies, the war
gods are placed on specific mountain peaks, mesas, and caves on Zuni land. Id. The images
created represent the twin brothers Masewi and Oyoyewi, the symbols for courage, strength,
and virtue. Id. Each war god serves as a guardian for the tribe until he is relieved by a new
one, and then the old one must remain, contributing its strength until it decays into dust.
Suro, supra, at 1, col. 1.
In the early nineteenth century, white scholars and museum collectors visiting the Zuni took
war god statues for future study and for public display. l Since that time, and particularly
during the 1920s and 1930s when the war gods were popular exotic items in fashionable
circles, the Zuni tribe has lost many to unscrupulous collectors. Id
The Zunis began trying to recover their statues in 1978. Id. They came across documen-
tary evidence showing that a statue stored in the Denver Art Museum was illegally taken from
the tribe by a nineteenth-century surveyor. IL Since 1978, the Zunis have recovered 38 war
god statues. Id They are negotiating for the return of every war god known to be in the
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patriation issue intensified.18 The virulent nature of the controversy
results from the conflicting positions taken by. the parties. Native
Americans assert their inherent right to regain control of their cul-
tural objects.' 9 The museums, on the other hand, underscore their
legal and ethical right to retain possession of their artistic
collections. 20
Despite the concerns voiced by museum representatives, Con-
gress reacted to Native American demands for repatriation and en-
acted the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of
1990 (Repatriation Act).2 ' The legislation directly addresses the re-
patriation issue and mandates the return of a large number of ob-
jects.22 While the Repatriation Act represents a step toward
providing Native Americans with the right to control their cultural
legacy, repatriation remains an unsettled issue for the Native Ameri-
can community. 23
hands of an American museum or collector. Id at col. 2. This includes more than 50 statues,
in 21 museums and 5 private collections. Id
18. See H.R. REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990) (observing Native American
interest in return of remains and funerary objects of ancestors and that heated debate is often
sparked concerning relative rights of Native Americans and museums).
19. See Echo-Hawk, supra note 16, at 441-43 (positing inalienability of Native Americans'
communal property).
20. See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 92 (statement of Tom Livesay, American Associa-
tion of Museums) (propounding that fiduciary duties of museums require preservation and
maintenance of collections in way that fulfills museum's purpose of public educational ser-
vice); id at 85 (outlining museums' general objections to legislation governing repatriation of
Native American objects and specific objections to legislation proposed). First, the American
Association of Museums believes adequate procedures are already available to facilitate re-
quests for repatriation. L at 86. These procedures are codified in internal museum policies
as well as in state and federal law. Id at 87. Second, procedures already in place permit
repatriation on a case-by-case basis and ensure the transfer of control and possession of cul-
tural objects to the proper parties or party. Id at 98-100. Third, a museum's primary mission
is to further public education and enlightenment. Il at 85. A museum's duty to the public
militates against the depletion of museum collections. L at 92. Fourth, museums also have a
responsibility to perform scientific research. Id. at 102-03. Any depletion of the collection
would hinder research efforts. Id at 103. Fifth, the museums foresee difficult and complex
issues in determining legal title to Native American cultural property. IL at 93. Issues raised
may include (1) the type of object in question; (2) the relevant transaction and/or events that
led to an object's current disposition; and (3) whether there are any relevant real property
rights that may affect title. Id at 94-95. Each of these issues may be answered in favor of the
museum's retention of Native American cultural property. Id at 95-100. Sixth, legislation
involving repatriation threatens the prohibition against unconstitutional taking of property.
L at 104.
21. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104
Stat. 3048 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001) [hereinafter Repatriation Act].
22. See infra notes 155-90 and accompanying text (explaining Repatriation Act).
23. See Wash. Post, May 18, 1991, at G7 (reporting that in May 1991, Navaho Association
of Medicine Men and Hopi Tribal Council took separate actions to halt auction of three cere-
monial objects at Sotheby's, Inc.). Neither the tribes' appeals or the threat of criminal sanc-
tions under the Repatriation Act, however, prevented the sale of the objects at the auction.
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1991, § 2, at 37, col. 1. Fortunately, Elizabeth Sackler, president of the
Arthur M. Sackler Foundation in New York, purchased the items so that they could be re-
turned to the tribes. Chi. Tribune, July 28, 1991, § Woman News, at 4. The Arthur M.
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This Comment focuses on the issue of repatriation, specifically
the return of Native American cultural objects stored in museum
collections. Part I demonstrates that the prior possessory interest
requirement of a common law action in replevin effectively bars Na-
tive American claimants from recovering their cultural items. 24 The
first section also discusses the difficulties posed by the statute of lim-
itations for the Native American plaintiff, despite the legal system's
attempt to modify the timing mechanism to assist the prior posses-
sor's cause. 25 Part II analyzes the development of statutory schemes
concerning the disposition of Native American cultural objects and
evinces Congress' increasing awareness of the need to repatriate.26
Part III submits a number of proposals aimed at minimizing the con-
troversy surrounding the repatriation of Native American cultural
resources. 27 These propositions include the expansion of the scope
of the legislation,28 the implementation of new management sys-
tems for the research and inventory of Native American cultural
property, 29 and the alteration of the current burden of proof
standard.30
Sackler Foundation is a nonprofit organization which catalogues and exhibits various collec-
tions. Id Ms. Sackler, however, acted not as an agent of the Foundation but as a private
citizen. Id She believed that her action was a step toward acknowledging the losses resulting
from the extermination of many Indian tribes, lad The Antique Tribal Arts Dealers Associa-
tion and the American Association of Museums are the two major forces opposing Native
Americans in their fight for repatriation. See 136 CONG. REc. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson) (stating that while it is important to satisfy demands of
Native American contingent, it is also important that it be done in manner that protects mu-
seums and collectors). Because the goals of the conflicting interest groups are diametrically
opposed, any significant request granted by Congress to the arts dealers or museums, acts to
the detriment of the Native American community. Id.
24. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text (analyzing common law action in re-
plevin within context of specific Native American community, Larsen Bay Village of Kodiak
Alaska).
25. See infra notes 52-109 and accompanying text (explaining function of statute of limi-
tations, traditional application of statute of limitations, modifications by courts of law to im-
prove plaintiffs' chances of recovery including demand refusal and discovery rule).
26. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (clarifying evolution of legislation con-
cerning disposition of Native American artifacts by analyzing four pieces of legislation: Antiq-
uities Act of 1906, Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Native American
Museum Act of 1989, and Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990).
27. See infra notes 191-231 and accompanying text (discussing legitimate and feasible
options available to Congress to respond more effectively to needs of the Native American
community).
28. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of bringing
Smithsonian Institution under purview of Repatriation Act).
29. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (noting that current wording of scientific
study clause is too vague and that modification is required to prevent abuse by museums).
30. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text (noting that new mechanism should be
developed in regard to unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony).
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I. REMEDY IN THE COURTS OF LAW
Public and private museums acquired their collections of Native
American cultural artifacts from a wide variety of sources and
through a number of different means. On occasion, museum acces-
sion records reveal the legitimate purchase of these artifacts.3 1
Records, however, also expose the less ethical methods employed
by museums to accumulate their vast collections. 32 Indeed, on
closer inspection, records reveal that a large proportion of sacred
artifacts housed in museum collections were stolen from their origi-
nal Native American owners.3 3 Despite the dubious character of
31. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 161-63 '(statement of Dr. Raymond Thompson,
American Association of Museums) (explaining ethical standards of museum collecting prac-
tices and stating that all museums are not guilty of transcending ethical standards of collec-
tion). According to Dr. Thompson, museum policies are directed by the belief that the Native
American culture created valuable artistic achievements as well as pieces of historical signifi-
cance. Id. at 159-60. Furthermore, the expansive nature of the museum's collecting practices
is an effort to save the works of art from the policies and practices of the United States govern-
ment. Id at 160. Government policies, in the opinion of museum curators, are causing the
rapid deterioration and outright disappearance of traditional Native American society and
culture. Id Museums legitimately collect objects to protect Native American culture from the
American public who view this traditional culture as nothing more than a curiosity. Id. It is
the American Association of Museums' position that only a few museums are guilty of failure
to apply appropriate standards to their collecting practices. Id.; see Senate Hearings, supra note
7, at 41-43 (statement of William L. Boyd, President, Field Museum of Natural History) (legit-
imizing collection practices of American museums).
32. See R. BIEDER, SCIENCE ENCOUNTERS THE INDIAN, 1820-1880: THE EARLY YEARS OF
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY 24-47 (1986) (delineating unethical and nefarious means employed by
museums to accumulate enormous collections of Native American cultural items during nine-
teenth century); see also RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 17, at 77 (reporting that docu-
mentation of objects within museum collections is hazy).
The Federal Agencies Task Force observed that the difficulties experienced by Native
Americans in reacquiring and retaining sacred objects are in large part the result of question-
able acquisition methods used by museums. The Task Force stated:
Museum accession records show that some sacred objects were sold by their origi-
nal Native owner or owners. In many instances, however, the chain of title does not
lead to the original owners. Some religious property left original ownership during
military confrontations, was included in the spoils of war and eventually fell into the
control of museums. Also in times past, sacred objects were lost by Native owners as
a result of less violent pressures exerted by federally-sponsored missionaries and
Indian agents....
Today in many parts of the country, it is common for "pot hunters" to enter In-
dian and public lands for the purpose of illegally expropriating sacred objects. Inter-
state trafficking in and exporting of such property flourishes, with some of these
sacred objects eventually entering into the possession of museums.
Id
33. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 17, at 77 (suggesting that individual Na-
tive Americans often perpetrated theft against fellow people and then converted stolen ob-
jects, which were then sold by others who did not have ownership or title to objects); see also
Note, supra note 9, at 132-33 (explaining that because of continuing prejudice against Indians
in parts of United States during time period in which many museums received Indian artifacts,
museums' assertions of valid legal title should be treated without suspicion); Nason, Finders
Keepers?, Museum News, Mar. 1973, at 23 (statement of Kenneth Hopkins, Director of State
Capitol Museum, Olympia, Washington) (stating that grave robbing is among favorite
archaeological games of white men and existence of artifacts legally acquired is questionable).
Mr. Hoplins suggests the questionable provenance of museum collections when he states:
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museum collections, Native Americans are relatively unsuccessful in
their efforts to recover lost cultural heritage.3 4 The failure of Native
American plaintiffs to regain possession of their cultural resources
can be attributed to the interplay between the common law action in
replevin and the statute of limitations.3 5
A. Action in Replevin
To recover lost property, a plaintiff must initiate an action in re-
plevin.36 In an action in replevin, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
prior possessory interest in the property.37 While it would appear
As for materials that were not "stolen," I doubt their existence. The legalisms that
confound the picture of Indian dispersal apply as well to Indian cultural relics. Here
in our Northwest, we live on land "legally" acquired from the Indians. Yet as the
history of the acquisition falls under scrutiny, we in local history find ourselves in the
awkward position of trying to interpret events that we would prefer not to have to
interpret.
Id
34. 136 CONG. REC. S 17,174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye). In
those instances where Native Americans attempted to recover inappropriately alienated tribal
items, they often met stiff resistance from museums who were unwilling to part with the ob-ject. Id. When faced with this hostility, the Native American community was virtually help-
less, for it had neither the legal ability nor the financial resources to pursue the return of its
cultural property. Id. In fact, Native Americans only had success in retrieving property in
those instances where a museum had moral or political motivation to agree to return the
property. Id.
35. See infra notes 36-109 and accompanying text (discussing obstacles to repatriation
posed by action in replevin and statute of limitations).
36. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.13 (1973). The common law action of replevin is the means
employed by claimants to regain possession of their property. Il The term used to describe
a common law action in replevin can vary from state to state and is known variously as deti-
nue, claim and delivery, or sequestration. Id. Replevin, however, is the most common label
applied to an action commenced to recover property. Il
37. See Banque De France v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 60 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding,
in suit for return of gold ingots, that in replevin action right to possession must be established
and suit may be brought for proportionate share of commingled mass); Wright v. Redding,
408 F. Supp. 1180, 1182-83 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (ruling, in action in replevin, that "the finder of ajewel.., has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the rightful owner").
The common law rule, known as the doctrine of relative title, was first enunciated in Armory
v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
In Armory, a chimney sweeper's boy found a mounted jewel and brought it to a goldsmith's
shop to discover the value of the chattel. Id. The goldsmith's apprentice proceeded to re-
move the stone from its setting and returned only the empty socket. Id. In the action com-
menced, the court held the title of the finder is good as against all the world but the true
owner. Id
The leading case espousing the majority interpretation of Armory is Anderson v. Gouldberg,
51 Minn. 294, 295, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (1892) (citing Armory for proposition that bare possessor
has "good title against all the world except those having a better title"). Support for the
Anderson majority interpretation of the doctrine of relative title in American law is extensive.
See Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U.L. REv.
1221, 1221 (1986) (stating that Anderson is leading case supporting view that title ofpossessor
is good against everyone but true owner). The doctrine also finds weighty authority in such
legal scholars as Justice Holmes, Dean Ames, and Sir Frederick Pollack. See 0. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LA.w 190 (M. Howe ed. 1963) (stating that mere possession is sufficient to maintain
action in replevin or trover); Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY
172, 179 (1913) (discussing possessor's ability to gain absolute property in chattel through
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that proving a prior possessory interest is an easy barrier to hurdle,
it represents a major obstacle to the Native American plaintiff seek-
ing to recover cultural property.
The enormity of the barrier results from a combination of two
factors. First, in most instances, Native Americans fail to possess
concrete proof of prior ownership.3 8 Documentation of a prior pos-
sessory interest can take a number of acceptable forms, including
written material, photographs, or references to specific incidents in-
dicating prior possession of the object.39 The second factor contrib-
uting to the inability of Native American claimants to satisfy the
prior possessory interest requirement is that the chain of posses-
sion, linking the item with the Native American party, is usually bro-
ken or vague.40
The dispute between the Larsen Bay Village of Kodiak Island,
Alaska and the Smithsonian Institution clearly reveals the practical
effect of the prior possessory interest requirement.4 1 Since 1986,
the Larsen Bay Village has negotiated in good faith with the Smith-
sonian Institution for the return of more than one thousand associ-
ated burial artifacts. 42 The contested objects were exhumed,
beginning in 1930, from an ancient burial ground identified by a
local "white" cannery supervisor.43 Subsequently, experts removed
the objects from the site and arranged for their shipment to the
Smithsonian Institution's collection. 44
Recently, negotiations stalled between the representatives of the
Larsen Bay Village and the Smithsonian Institution. The issue, cre-
ating the deadlock, is whether the existing village and its inhabitants
tort ofwrongful taking of chattels); F. POLLACK & R. WRIGrr, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE
COMMON LAW 91-93 (1888) (stating that existing possession establishes rights protected
against interference even though wrongdoer can show superior title in third party, and dis-
cussing doctrine of trover). Each of these great legal minds concludes that the doctrine of
relative title is deeply rooted in common law and that its objective and logical approach is
demonstrative of the legal system's bias toward detached objective standards. See Helmholz,
supra, at 1222 (noting that commentators have viewed majority rule as vindicated by common
law's preference for pure objectivity).
38. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 241-42 (statement ofJames Reid, Antique Tribal
Art Dealers Association, Inc. & Sotheby's, Inc.) (noting that Native Americans need stronger
documentary basis to pursue artifacts).
39. Id.
40. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 17, at 77.
41. See American Indian Museum Act: Hearing on H.R. 2688 Before the House Comms.
on Interior Insular Affairs Administration and Public Works and Transportation, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1989) [hereinafter Museum Act Hearings] (stating that difficulties have
arisen in obtaining artifacts even though there are only 180 villagers who are direct lineal
descendants of Alaskan native peoples who have been in continuous habitation of island since
time immemorial).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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hold a prior possessory interest in the disputed materials. 45 Wit-
nesses, testifying on behalf of the Larsen Bay Village, postulate that
the objects and remains are culturally related to the present day vil-
lage, and as a result, the villagers enjoy a distinguishable prior pos-
sessory interest and a cognizable claim.46 Nevertheless, the
Smithsonian Institution views the showing by the Native Americans
as inadequate.47 The museum contends that more evidence mani-
festing the relationship of the objects to the present day claimants is
required before the Larsen Bay Village's interest is properly estab-
lished.48 Consequently, Smithsonian officials feel justified in refus-
ing to repatriate the objects.49
Although representatives of the Larsen Bay Village chose to ne-
gotiate rather than litigate their claim, the option to initiate an ac-
tion in replevin exists. At the outset of replevin proceedings, the
Native Americans would be required to prove a valid prior posses-
sory interest.50 As indicated above, the ability of Larsen Bay Villag-
ers to make the required showing is questionable. As a result, a
court of law would be likely to grant a summary judgment for the
Smithsonian Institution, citing the Native Americans' failure to sat-
isfy the initial burden of proving prior possession.5 1
B. Statute of Limitations
If Native American plaintiffs properly establish prior possession
of the lost item, the first barrier to recovery of the item is over-
come.5 2 The statute of limitations, however, may bar the action in
replevin. 53 This judicially created mechanism defines the period in
45. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 66 (statement of Henry Sockbeson, Native Ameri-
can Rights Fund) (discussing difficulty faced by villagers in establishing prior possessory inter-
est to scientific certainty, despite fact that villagers have been direct lineal descendants from
original possessors).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id
49. Id. at 66-67.
50. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing common law action in re-
plevin and stating that showing of prior possessory interest is required to successfully satisfy
initial burden of proof).
51. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (indicating that burden of proving prior
possessory interest is often too great for Native American plaintiffs due to unique circum-
stances surrounding Native American communities).
52. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (indicating that proving prior possessory
interest is first major obstacle to Native American plaintiff seeking recovery of lost cultural
item).
53. See Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Comptroller of N.Y., 177 U.S. 318, 324 (1900)
(recognizing that establishment of statute of limitations is state's prerogative); Atchafalya
Land Co. v. F.B. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 190, 197 (1922) (stating that state legisla-
tures have constitutional power, subject to restrictions of local state constitutions, to set peri-
ods within which actions may be brought). Authorities, however, require that a limitation
1992] NATIVE AMERICAN REPATRIATION RIGHTS 529
which the plaintiff possesses a legal right to assert a valid claim in a
court of law.54 At the completion of the statutory time limit, the
claimant's privilege of employing a judicial forum to redress the in-
jury expires. 55
To provide the prior possessor of personal property with a
greater opportunity to recover an item from a subsequent posses-
sor, courts of law modified the existing common law doctrine per-
taining to statutes of limitations. 56 The simplest means to provide
the prior possessor of personal property with an opportunity to
claim his chattel is to toll the running of the statute of limitations.
57
statute be reasonable. Idl A limitation period is reasonable if it provides enough time for
potential plaintiffs to assert their rights. Id. While the statute of limitations may bar actions
for the recovery of property, an action for damages brought by a Native American party is not
subject to the state statute of limitations, and cannot be barred by the expiration of this legal
timing device. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(a) (West Supp. 1991); see also Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 (permitting Indian tribes' federal common law right of action for
violation of property rights to real property despite fact that property had been illegally taken
in 1795 and concluding that statute of limitations created no obstacle to litigation of claim).
54. See Comment, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177,
1179 (1950) [hereinafter Comment, Developments in the Law] (noting that provisions for post-
ponement or extension are included for special circumstances); Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of
Limitation, 16 Sw. U.L. REv. 1, 1 (1986) (stating that legal systems have uniformly adopted
various time periods within which lawsuits must be commenced); Comment, The Recovery of
Stolen Art of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1122, 1125 (1980)
[hereinafter Comment, Stolen Art] (stating that action must be filed within statutory period).
55. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895) (stating that statute of limita-
tions only directly affects remedy and does not extinguish substantive right); Chase Sec. Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (noting that statute of limitations cuts off ability to
resort to courts for enforcement of claim; it does not destroy right to claim).
Although the result of the statute of limitations is severe, the legal construction is justified.
Individuals with valid claims generally do not neglect to act on them. Therefore, when a
period of years passes without the original owner attempting to enforce a demand, it creates a
presumption against the validity of the claim. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 386, 390 (1868). Additionally, statutes of limitations reflect important public policy
concerns, such as encouraging the prompt pursuit of claims and punishing those who fail to
diligently enforce their legal rights. Leake v. Bullock, 104 N.J. Super. 309, 313, 250 A.2d 27,
29 (App. Div. 1969) (citing Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 108, 207 A.2d
513, 517 (1965)). Finally, statutes of limitations act to preserve a sense of fairness for the
defendant, in terms of stipulating at what point in time he or she will no longer be answerable
to a claim. Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 54, at 1185.
56. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478,494, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (1980) (stating that these
modifications are based on principles of equity so that claimants can avoid unfair results
caused by rigid application of statute of limitations). For other cases in which courts modify
the statute of limitations, see, e.g., Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450-51, 173 A.2d 277, 286
(1961) (stating that statute of limitations in medical malpractice suits should not begin to run
for plaintiff who has foreign object left in abdomen, until she knew or had reason to know of
its existence); New Mkt. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 425, 241 A.2d 633, 636-
37 (1968) (modifying statute of limitations to instance where negligent installation of under-
ground conduit caused flooding of plaintiff's property and where plaintiff did not know of
negligent installation until eleven years later when flooding occurred); Burd v. New Jersey
Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92, 386 A.2d 1310, 1314-15 (1978) (explaining that discovery rule
postpones running of statute of limitations until plaintiff becomes aware or should have be-
come aware of facts which may give rise to cause of action).
57. See Comment, Stolen Art, supra note 54, at 1132 (recognizing court's attempt to avoid
harsh result affecting owner of stolen painting). Modifications to the statute of limitations
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Consequently, courts graft upon the statute of limitations corollary
doctrines such as the demand refusal requirement58 or the discovery
rule, to delay the accrual of the statutory time period.59
1. Demand refusal and the statute of limitations
The Menzel v. List decision 60 articulated the demand refusal re-
quirement, as it pertains to stolen art.61 The case focused on the
ownership of a painting by Marc Chagall, entitled "Le Paysan a
L'6chelle" or "The Peasant on the Ladder."'62 The Menzels, in
1932, bought the painting through the Galerie Georges Giroux in
Brussels, Belgium. 63 With the commencement of the Second World
War, the German army invaded Belgium, and the Menzels fled to
the United States, leaving behind the Chagall painting.64 Subse-
quently, in 1941, the Nazi occupational forces illegally removed the
work from the Menzel's residence. 65 The whereabouts of "The
Peasant on the Ladder" remained unknown between 1941 and
1955.66 In 1955, however, a Parisian gallery sold the painting to a
New York gallery which, in turn, sold the work to Mr. List.67 Since
the end of the war, the Menzels actively searched for their painting
and, in 1962, Mrs. Menzel discovered it in the possession of Mr.
List.68 Mrs. Menzel immediately instituted an action in replevin,
and List responded by raising a defense which claimed that the
three-year statute of limitations barred the action.69
The court held that a cause of action for replevin arises, not upon
the stealing or taking, but rather upon the plaintiff's request for the
evolved due to unjust results which occurred from the mechanical application of the statute of
limitations. Id.
58. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (detailing demand refusal requirement
and its means of extending statute of limitations).
59. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (analyzing discovery rule and its ability
to extend statutory period in which action in replevin may be brought).
60. 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified as to damages, 28 A.D.2d
516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd as to modifications, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742,
298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
61. Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 304, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (citing
Cohen v. M. Keizer, Inc., 246 A.D. 277, 278, 285 N.Y.S. 488, 489 (App. Div. 1936)) (holding
that cause of action in replevin arises at time defendant refuses, upon demand, to convey
property).
62. Id. at 304, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
63. Id. at 301-03, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807-08.
64. ld at 303, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
65. See id. at 312-13, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 816-17 (discussing confiscation of private property
in violation of specific treaty obligations to United States).
66. See id. at 303, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (acknowledging that no information was available
pertaining to painting's whereabouts during time period).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 302, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
69. Id.; see N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 214(3) (McKinney 1990) (stating that actions to re-
cover chattel must be commenced within three years).
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object and the defendant's refusal to convey the object.70 Thus, the
demand refusal doctrine requires that, before the period of accrual
begins, the plaintiff must demand the property and the defendant
must refuse to return the property. 71 To initiate the exchange re-
sulting in a demand and a refusal, the plaintiff must know the iden-
tity of the individual presently possessing the property. 72
Consequently, until the prior possessor identifies and states a claim
of superior title to the present possessor, the statute is effectively
tolled 73 for an unspecified period of time.74
On its face, the Menzel demand refusal requirement would appear
to facilitate the recovery of cultural objects by Native Americans. In
truth, the doctrine provides little relief for the Native American
plaintiff. First, it can be argued that the New York trial court, the
court initially applying the demand refusal doctrine to stolen art, is
itself unsure of the validity of the doctrine, for New York case law
appears to undermine the Menzel holding.75 Thus, demand refusal
70. Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 304, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
71. See id- (stating that, in replevin, cause of action against individual who lawfully pos-
sesses chattel begins when defendant refuses to convey property upon demand of plaintiff).
Menzel continues in its analysis noting that the "demand by the rightful owner is a substantive,
rather than a procedural, prerequisite to the bringing of an action in conversion by the
owner." Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964). Menzel is
based on a previous New York decision, Gillet v. Roberts. Id.; see Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28,
34 (1874) (stating that, in action to recover converted property, rule requiring owner to prove
that purchaser refused to return property upon demand is reasonable rule in that it serves to
inform purchaser of defect in title and grants opportunity to deliver property before liability
attaches for wrongful conversion); see also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F.
Supp. 829, 846-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (reaffirming use of demand refusal rule), aff'd, 678 F.2d
1150 (2d Cir. 1982). The court states "[i]t is not this court's function to improve upon, but
only to follow New York law." Id. at 848.
Elicofon involved two portraits painted by the fifteenth century German artist Albrecht Du-
erer. id. at 830. The paintings disappeared from a castle where they were being stored to
protect them from allied bombardment during the brief occupation of American forces in the
summer of 1945. Id. In 1946, a former American serviceman purporting to be vested with
proper title to the works arrived in Brooklyn and resold the works of art for $450 to Elicofon.
Id. at 833. Elicofon, an art collector with an untrained eye, hung the paintings in his living
room, unaware that each portrait was a priceless piece of German national history. Id Upon
the discovery in 1966, that Albrecht Duerer created the pieces, the information was released
to the media. Id. In 1966, the Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, a museum in what was then
East Germany, demanded the immediate return of the items. Id at 830. Subsequently, the
defendant refused to comply and the museum instituted an action in replevin. Id.
72. See Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 304-05, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (reasoning that until plaintiff
identifies and demands return of property, possessor may not realize wrong doing and thus
may miss opportunity to return property to true owner before incurring liability) (relying on
Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 34 (1874)).
73. See id. (stating, in finding for Menzel, that statute of limitations did not begin to run
until true owner could make a demand for property and present owner refused).
74. Id.
75. See Stroganoff-Scherbatoffv. Weldon, 420 .F. Supp. 18, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (question-
ing, in dicta, validity of demand refusal requirement). The dispute involved two artistic mas-
terpieces, one a portrait of Antoine Triest, Bishop of Ghent, by Sir Anthony Van Dyck, valued
in 1974 at $50,000 and, the other, a bust of Diderot by Houdon with a property value of
$350,000 at the time of the action. IM. at 19. The Soviet government, by official decree,
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provides only limited security; the Native American plaintiff must
constantly fear the rejection of the doctrine by the court adjudicat-
ing the claim. Second, a large number of state courts specifically
declined to include demand and refusal as elements necessary in a
replevin action.76 As a result, the Native American plaintiff derives
the benefit of the doctrine in only a limited number ofjurisdictions.
Finally, even if state courts uniformly accepted demand refusal as a
viable legal doctrine, it would fail to provide many Native Americans
with an opportunity to be heard in court. Frequently, the objects
Native Americans wish to repatriate are housed in accessible public
appropriated both works in 1921 and later transported them to Berlin for sale at an auction
house in 1931. Id At auction, a London gallery purchased the Triest portrait. Id. at 20. It
was later sold to a second gallery and ultimately purchased by the defendant Weldon. Id. The
record is unclear as to who purchased the Diderot bust at the Berlin auction. Id. In 1965,
however, a New York art dealer donated the piece to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Id.
The plaintiff, George Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, brought two suits of conversion, one against
the possessor of the bust and the other against the possessor of the portrait. Id. at 19. He
commenced the actions in 1974, fifty-three years after the seizure by the Soviet Government.
Id. The New York Court presiding over the conversion actions consolidated them by decree
in 1975. Id. The plaintiff alleged that he was the direct descendant of Count Alexander
Sergevitch Stroganoff, the original owner of both works of art. Id. at 20. Consequently, he
would be the rightful owner by lineal succession of the bust and portrait. Id. Defendant re-
butted plaintiff's argument concerning the provenance of the pieces and contended that the
act of state doctrine, as well as the statute of limitations barred the granting of any reliefto the
plaintiff. Id. The act of state doctrine forbids courts from independently examining the con-
fiscation of property by foreign states who are recognized by the United States and where the
taking occurred within the states' territorial borders. Id
The court did not reach the issue of the statute of limitations. It commented, however, in
dicta upon the subject in a footnote. Id. at 22 n.5. The court cited 206(a) of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, which states in pertinent part: "where a demand is necessary to
entitle a person to commence an action, the time within which the action must be commenced
shall be computed from the time when the right to make the demand is complete." N.Y. Civ.
PIRc. L. & R. 206(a) (McKinney 1972). Relying on this statute the court went on to state that
any right plaintiff's mother had to make a demand for the pieces terminated in 1931 when the
portrait and bust were sold at the Berlin auction. Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, 420 F. Supp. at 22 n.5.
Under the New York statute of limitations, it would appear that the time for commencing an
action in conversion had already run at the time of Princess Stroganoff-Scherbatoff's death in
1944. Id
Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, when read in tandem with Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 78 Misc. 2d 805,
355 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Civ. Ct. 1974), undermines the validity of Menzel. Fries states that the time
to make the demand is commenced when the alleged wrong is committed even if the plaintiff
is unaware of the facts necessary to expose the potential defendant. Id. at 810, 355 N.Y.S.2d
at 747. Fries involved an action for conversion brought by a bank which acted as executor of a
decedent's estate and which mistakenly delivered two rings that were nonestate property to
defendant. The court's position is clear when it stated that "[iun short, the statute of limita-
tions runs, not from the demand, but from the time when the bank was entitled to make the
demand. Were the rule otherwise, a plaintiffmight extend the statute indefinitely, merely by
postponing the making of a demand." Id.
Here, the bank was entitled to make a demand on December 12, 1967, the day it mistakenly
gave the rings to defendant. The bank, however, was ignorant of the facts which gave it the
right to make a demand until August 1969. The court held that "ignorance does not stop the
clock .... unless the defendant engages in fraudulent or misleading conduct.. ." which this
defendant did not. Id. at 810, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48.
76. See Comment, Stolen Art, supra note 54, at 1139 (recognizing that demand require-
ment may end up favoring bad faith possessor rather than good faith possessor and thereby
states may opt not to apply doctrine).
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institutions such as museums. 77 In many instances, the Native
American, aware of the location of an object, demanded its return. 78
In response, the museum rejeeted the Native American request and
refused to return the object. When any form of demand and refusal
occurs, the demand refusal doctrine permits the accrual of the stat-
ute of limitations. Consequently, a present day Native American re-
lying on the demand refusal doctrine to toll the statute of limitations
may find that the time period allotted for the initiation of claims
expired and that the statute of limitations bars the action from the
courts of law.
2. Discovery rule and the statute of limitations
O'Keeffe v. Snyder,7 9 decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
is the leading case involving the discovery rule as it relates to per-
sonal property.8 0 The renowned American artist, Georgia O'Keeffe,
commenced an action to regain possession of the paintings entitled
"Cliffs," "Seaweed," and "Fragments." 8 1 An unknown individual
stole the works of art, in 1946, from the gallery owned by her hus-
band, Alfred Steiglitz.82 At the time of the theft, O'Keeffe men-
tioned the loss to various associates, but neglected to energetically
pursue her property. 83 The artist waited until 1972 to register the
paintings as stolen with the Art Dealers Association of America.84
In 1976, O'Keeffe learned that Barry Snyder possessed the paint-
ings. She subsequently commenced an action in replevin to recover
the works.8 5
The court's decision in O'Keeffe v. Snyder outlined the require-
ments of the discovery rule.86 To determine whether a plaintiff is
entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule the court required the
77. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 56 (statement of Henry Sockbeson, Native Ameri-
can Rights Fund) (explaining that many tribal objects are housed in federal and state
museums).
78. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (indicating that demand and refusal is com-
mon event between Native Americans and museums).
79. 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
80. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 493-94, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (1980) (finding that
discovery rule is better suited to obtaining equitable resolutions in personal property cases
involving art than is adverse possession rule).
81. Ia at 484, 416 A.2d at 865.
82. Idt
83. Id.
84. See id. at 485-86, 416 A.2d at 866 (acknowledging that record did not contain infor-
mation indicating whether registry existed at time of theft).
85. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866. The court held in favor of the plaintiff, Georgia
O'Keeffe, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division, and remanded the matter for a
plenary hearing in accordance with its opinion. Id. at 505, 416 A.2d at 877.
86. Id. at 493-94, 416 A.2d at 870.
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satisfaction of a three-prong test.8 7 First, from the time immediately
proceeding the alleged theft, the claimant must use "due diligence"
to recover the item.8 Second, the test requires that the individual
"alert the world" as to the theft of the object.8 9 Finally, the plaintiff
must put a "reasonably prudent purchaser" of art on constructive
notice that someone other than the present possessor may be the
true owner.90 If the plaintiff satisfactorily proves each of these ele-
ments, the court tolls the statute of limitations until the owner
knows or reasonably should know the identity of the possessor of his
chattel. 9  *
The discovery rule enforces the bar of the statute of limitations on
neglectful individuals who sit on their rights and fail to pursue, with
proper diligence, the recovery of their property. 92 Unlike the tradi-
tional common law, the discovery rule recognizes that a person kept
ignorant as to the location of his personal property or to the identity
of the present possessor should not be barred from initiating a claim
in a court of law. 93 Furthermore, the rule forces the court to evalu-
ate the conduct of the prior possessor rather than the conduct of the
present possessor.94 Thus, a court employing discovery rule analy-
sis will not inquire whether a demand and refusal has occurred. 95 A
claim will be barred or permitted solely on the basis of the plaintiff's
conduct after the alleged theft of the item.96
While the discovery rule provides the courts with a flexible, equi-
table doctrine that protects the right of the prior possessor, it also
satisfies the policy considerations used to justify the original com-
87. Id.
88. d
89. I.
90. Id at 493-94, 416 A.2d at 870.
91. Id. at 491, 416 A.2d at 869. The court stated that under the discovery rule the bur-
den falls on the owner of the stolen object to establish specific facts that justify tolling the
statute of limitations. Id at 497, 416 A.2d at 873. Therefore, the court required O'Keeffe to
prove to the trial court that, among other things, she used due diligence at the time of the
theft to recover the paintings; that, other than speaking with colleagues, no other effective
method existed for alerting the world to the theft; and that registering the painting with the
Art Dealers Association of America would put a reasonably prudent purchaser on constructive
notice that the piece was stolen from its true owner. Id. at 493-94, 416 A.2d at 870. The court
noted that "the rule permits an artist who uses reasonable efforts to report, investigate, and
recover a painting to preserve the rights of title and possession." Id. at 498, 416 A.2d at 872.
92. Id. at 502, 416 A.2d at 875.
93. See id. (stating that discovery rule is equitable and seeks to avoid unjust results).
94. See id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872 (recognizing this focus to be different than that for
adverse possession). Adverse possession requires that possession be actual, open and notori-
ous, hostile, exclusive, and continuous. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOCBACK & D. WHITMAN, TilE
LAW OF PROPERTY, § 11.7, at 758 (2d ed. 1988).
95. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 497, 416 A.2d 862, 873 (1980) (emphasizing that if
original owner wants to toll accrual period he must present facts which warrant tolling accrual
period).
96. Id. at 493-94, 416 A.2d at 870.
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mon law application of the statute of limitations. 97 The doctrine en-
courages activity by the prior possessor who might otherwise remain
inactive. 98 It punishes the plaintiff who negligently or intentionally
fails to utilize, in a timely fashion, rights granted by the law. 99 Fi-
nally, the discovery rule protects the repose of a present possessor
from a dilatory prior possessor by freeing him from the threat of
litigation.100
Like demand refusal, the discovery rule doctrine is often an inef-
fective aid to the Native American who wishes to recover a cultural
object from a museum. The discovery rule's inability to provide Na-
tive Americans with the relief it grants to other plaintiffs does not
result from internal inconsistencies or vague terminology. Rather, it
occurs from the inaction of the Native American claimant. Upon the
theft of an item, Native American owners often neglected to report
the incident.' 0 1 Many objects stored in museum collections were ac-
quired in the distant past and claims were not diligently pursued.
10 2
In some instances, Native Americans were aware of the location of
their tribal artifact as well as the identity of its present possessor,
but still failed to institute a claim for its recovery.'03 An inquiring
court could construe this inactivity as a failure on the part of the
Native American plaintiff, to use "due diligence," to "alert the
world" or to place a "reasonably prudent purchaser on notice."'
10 4
97. See Comment, Stolen Art, supra note 54, at 1127 (recognizing that purposes of statute
of limitations are to penalize parties who do not bring claims to court promptly and to prevent
unfairness by assuring defendants certain time period after which they can reasonably expect
to not have to defend against claim); supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing public
policy considerations behind traditional common law application of statute of limitations).
98. See Comment, Stolen Art, supra note 54, at 1127 (citing Rosenau v. City of New Bruns-
wick, 51 NJ. 130, 136, 238 A.2d 169, 172 (1968)) (stating that statute of limitations, through
its punishment of negligent behavior, stimulates people to act on their claims); see also Leake v.
Bullock, 104 N.J. Super. 309, 313, 250 A.2d 27, 29 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (discussing fairness as
underlying public policy consideration of traditional common law application of statute of
limitations).
99. Comment, Stolen Art, supra note 54, at 1127.
100. See id. at 1128 (citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)) (recognizing that right to be free from untimely claims prevails
over right to take action).
101. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 241-42 (statement of James Reid, the Antique
Tribal Art Dealers Association, Inc. & Sotheby's, Inc.) (stating that neglecting to keep inven-
tory lists of cultural items, to maintain safe storage areas, and to file police reports of missing
items, places Native Americans at disadvantage when trying to pursue legal claims).
102. ld; see R. BIEDER, SCIENCE ENCOUNTERS THE INDIAN, 1820-1880: THE EARLY YEARS
OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY 23-35 (1986) (noting that many museums acquired bulk of their
collections by excavating graves during nineteenth century).
103. Conversation with Henry Sockbeson, Vice President, Native American Rights Fund,
in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 14, 1990).
104. See O'Keeffe, 83 NJ. at 493-94, 416 A.2d at 870 (noting that owner is responsible for
attempting to alert public that property is stolen).
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Under this interpretation, the Native American potentially fails each
prong of the discovery rule as articulated in O'Keeffe v. Snyder.
Until recently, Native Americans appeared guilty of the inaction
that the statute of limitations was designed to punish. 10 5 A number
of legitimate justifications, however, exist for the Native American's
failure to pursue claims for the recovery of their cultural heritage.
Each justification should be considered before a court mechanically
applies the statute of limitations bar. First, Native Americans felt,
perhaps rightly so, that the system was inherently biased.'0 6 As a
result, they believed that any claim brought within the system would
fail.' 0 7 Furthermore, Native Americans viewed common and statu-
tory law as unresponsive to their plight. 108 Consequently, any effort
to bring a claim against a museum would be unsupported by ex-
isting law. Finally, in many instances, the Native American plaintiffs
were simply unable to financially support the extensive litigation
necessary to retrieve cultural objects from America's museums.'0 9
In summary, the judicial system is incapable of providing an ade-
quate remedy to aggrieved Native American plaintiffs seeking to re-
cover cultural objects. The action in replevin and the statute of
limitations combine to effectively preclude the Native American
claimant from recovering his or her property. Where the courts of
law fail to forge a sufficient remedy for a particular class, it is within
the power of the United States Congress to provide a statutory
remedy.
II. STATUTES RELATING TO NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL PROPERTY
Four legislative endeavors, the Antiquities Act of 1906 (Antiqui-
ties Act)," 0 the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979
(Archeological Resources Protection Act),"' the National Museum
of the American Indian Act of 1989 (Museum Act), 1 2 and the Na-
tive American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (Repatriation
105, See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (discussing inactivity resulting from
barriers that Native Americans have faced in pursuing return of cultural items); supra note 55
(discussing justifications for statutes of limitations, including punishment for inactivity).
106. Note, supra note 9, at 125.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See House Hearing, supra note 12, at 74 (statement of Henry Sockbeson, Native Ameri-
can Rights Fund) (noting that expense of litigation deters Native Americans from utilizing
courts).
110. Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 431-433 (1988)).
111. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988)).
112. National Museum of the American Indian Act, Pub. L. No. 101-185, 103 Stat. 1336
(1989) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q-1 to -15 (Supp. 1 1989)).
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Act)' 13 document the development of the legislature's attitudes to-
ward Native American cultural resources. When viewed together,
these acts illustrate the growth of America's willingness to recognize
the rights of Native Americans to possess their cultural heritage.
Congress conceived the Antiquities Act and the Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act to regulate the flow of Native American cul-
tural items from federal lands and to stifle the illicit commerce of
the goods.1 14 Each, however, neglected to recognize the Native
American's right to regain possession of those objects already
within the collections of America's museums. 1 5 Although the Mu-
seum Act focuses on the establishment of a museum, 1 6 it also rep-
resents Congress' initial recognition of the Native American's right
to regain possession of a narrowly defined group of objects within
the Smithsonian Institution. ' 17 The Repatriation Act, Congress'
most recent effort to eliminate the repatriation controversy, ex-
pands the scope of the Museum Act and grants Native Americans
expansive powers to retrieve cultural objects.11 8
A. Antiquities Act of 1906
As early as 1906, Congress recognized that the indiscriminate ex-
cavation and removal of Native American cultural resources from
federal lands was a significant problem requiring immediate ac-
tion.1 19 In an attempt to prohibit the removal of Native American
cultural objects from federal property, Congress enacted the Antiq-
113. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104
Star. 3048 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013).
114. See H.R. REP. No. 2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1906) (setting forth purpose of
Antiquities Act as preservation, via creation of small land reservations, of prehistoric relics
found on public and private lands in southwest United States); H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1709, 1710 (defining
purpose of Archaeological Resources Protection Act as protection of archaeological resources
found on public and Indian lands via imposition of civil and criminal penalties for removal or
damage of such resources).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1988) (providing for permanent display in public museums of an-
tiquities gathered for benefit of scientific and educational institutions); 16 U.S.C. 99 470aa-
470gg (1988) (preserving antiquities yet to be found on public and Native American lands but
failing to provide for repatriation of museum-held items).
116. See 20 U.S.C. § 80q-1 (Supp. 1 1989) (setting forth primary purpose of Act as estab-
lishment of Native American museum within Smithsonian Institution).
117. See H.R. REP. No. 340(1), 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 9, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 776, 777 (stating that "other goal" of Museum Act is orderly transfer of
Indian remains and funerary objects to appropriate families and tribes).
118. See Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, §§ 5-7, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052-55 (1990) (to
be codified at 25 U.S.C. 99 3003-3005) (compelling federally-funded museums' inventory of
Native American collections, notification of affected families, tribes, or organizations, and ex-
peditious return of items upon request of Native Americans).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 2224, supra note 114, at 2 3 (acknowledging educational value of
Native American artifacts and decrying recent extensive traffic in relics from ruin areas; stat-
ing that legislation properly securing ruin areas is in interest of science and urgently needed).
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uities Act.' 20 Three major sections comprise the body of the Antiq-
uities Act. The first section pertains to the designation of national
monuments.' 2 ' The second section requires the issuance of a valid
permit to examine ruins, commence excavation, or gather objects of
antiquity.' 22 The final section of the Act contains an enforcement
mechanism, making violations of the Act a criminal offense punish-
able by fine or imprisonment. 123
Despite Congress' good intentions, the Antiquities Act suffers
from technical deficiencies. On its face, the Act fails to provide Na-
tive Americans with a mechanism to retrieve items in museum col-
lections.' 24 Furthermore, the number of years required for an
ordinary object to become an "object of antiquity" is conspicuously
absent.' 25 Finally, the Antiquities Act leaves undefined what actu-
ally constitutes an "object of antiquity."' 26 As a result of the impre-
cise language, in United States v. Diaz,127 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the Antiquities Act unconstitu-
tionally vague.' 28
120. See H.R. REP. No. 2224, supra note 114, at 1 (specifying Antiquities Act's purpose as
preservation of antiquities in-place; for example, removal of items from specified lands is pro-
hibited); Note, supra note 9, at 1333 (suggesting prevention of artifact removal is ideal method
to preserve Native American ownership and interpreting Antiquities Act as attempt to so pro-
tect Native American property rights).
121. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1988) (authorizing President of United States to create national
monuments to protect historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other ob-jects of historic or scientific interest that are situated on public lands).
122.. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1988). The statute provides:
Permits for the examination of ruins, the excavation of archaeological sites, and the
gathering of objects of antiquity upon the lands under their respective jurisdictions
may be grantedby the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Army to institu-
tions which they may deem properly qualified to conduct such examination, excava-
tion, or gathering, subject to such rules and regulations as they may prescribe:
Provided, That the examinations, excavations, and gatherings are undertaken for the
benefit of reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other recognized scientific or
edpcational institutions, with a view to increasing the knowledge of such objects, and
that the gatherings shall be made for permanent preservation in public museums.
Id (emphasis in original).
123. See 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988) (stating that any action contrary to rules and regulations
outlined in Act is criminal offense). The penalty imposed for violating the terms of the Act is
a fine of not more than $500, imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both fine and
imprisonment. lIt
124. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988) (protecting objects of antiquity or private lands but
failing to address repatriation method for items held by museums).
125. See id (prohibiting such activities as appropriation, excavation, destruction of objects
of antiquity but failing to define time requirement for object to become "object of antiquity").
126. Id (proscribing activities concerning objects of antiquity, but never defining "object
of antiquity"). Legislative history also does not clarify the uncertainty as to the definition of
"object of antiquity." See H.R. REP. No. 2224, supra note 114, at 1-3; S. REP. No. 3797, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1906) (failing to clarify definition of object of antiquity).
127. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
128. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974). The result in United States v.
Diaz seriously hampered Native American efforts to protect their buried artifacts. Note, supra
note 9, at 136. In Diaz, a United States magistrate convicted defendant Diaz of stealing
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Substantive deficiencies also plague the Antiquities Act. The
terms of the Act legitimized the removal of artifacts for valid re-
search, permanent preservation, and display,129 and thereby unwit-
tingly sanctioned the pillage of Native American cultural objects by
academic institutions and museums. As a result of this legislation,
museums developed substantial collections of burial objects, sacred
objects, and objects of inalienable communal property. 130 Thus,
legislation designed to protect Native American cultural resources
served instead to heighten tensions between Native Americans and
museums collecting Native American cultural property.
The inadequacies of the Antiquities Act permitted the illicit flow
of articles from public land and the destruction of resources result-
ing from uncontrolled excavations to escalate. 13' In spite of Con-
gress' initial effort, Native American burial objects, sacred objects,
and objects of cultural patrimony became increasingly endangered
by illicit collectors, "pothunters,"' 13 2 who sought to capitalize on the
Apache artifacts from a medicine man's cave on the San Carlos reservation. United States v.
Diaz, 368 F. Supp..856, 857 (D. Ariz. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1914). The stolen
artifacts included "approximately twenty-two face masks, headdresses, ocotillo sticks, bull-
roarers, fetishes, and muddogs." Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's affirma-
tion of the magistrate's conviction of the defendant under the Antiquities Act. Diaz, 499 F.2d
at 115. The court declared Diaz's criminal conviction invalid because the Antiquities Act
failed to define adequately the terms "ruin," "monument," or "object of antiquity," and so, as
a result, the Act was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 114-15. In reaction to the Diaz decision,
several states as well as Indian nations attempted to obviate the failings of the Antiquities Act.
Note, supra note 9, at 137. These bodies reworked the unconstitutionally vague language, as
well as the criminal penalties imposed by the federal Act. lId For example, Colorado now
protects "any historical, prehistorical, or archaeological resource," which is defined to include
"all deposits, structures, or objects which provide information pertaining to the historical or
prehistoric culture of people within the boundaries of the state of Colorado, as well as fossils
and other remains of animals, plants, insects, and other objects of natural history within such
boundaries." CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-80-401 (1988).
129. See 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1988) (justifying removal of artifacts by scientific or educational
institutions as way to increase social knowledge).
130. See Note, supra note 9, at 134 (suggesting that Antiquities Act encouraged museums
to gather Native American cultural objects).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(3) (1988) (noting that "existing federal laws do not provide
adequate protection to prevent loss and destruction of Native American resources resulting
from uncontrolled excavations and pillage").
132. Pothunters may be individuals searching for interesting souvenirs, or heavily armed
and well-equipped individuals that reap high profits from illegally obtained Native American
artifacts. Note, supra note 9, at 134 n.71. The means employed by professional pothunters to
uncover Native American artifacts are extremely sophisticated. Id. Pothunters use helicopters
and satellite maps to chart remote areas and evaluate the potential of uncovering buried arti-
facts. Id. Once a site is located, pothunters are known to use bulldozers or other destructive
means to locate artifacts quickly. Id. The results of their work are devastating to both future
archaeological study and to the items buried in the ground. Id.
Once a site has been worked over by looters in order to remove a few salable objects,
[the] fragile fabric of its history is largely destroyed. Changes in soil color, the traces
of ancient floors and fires, the imprint of vanished textiles and foodstuffs, the rela-
tion between one object and another, and the positions of a skeleton-all of these
sources of fugitive information are ignored and obliterated by archaeological looters.
Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, SCIENCE, Jan. 21, 1972, at 263. See The Plunder of the
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soaring monetary value of Native American artifacts. ,l 3 Never for-
mally repealed, the Act remains in force today.' 3 4 It has been
largely superseded, however, by the Archaeological Resources Pro-
tection Act. 135
B. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act cures many of the
inherent defects of the Antiquities Act. First, it remedies the uncon-
stitutionally vague language of its predecessor by limiting itself to
the control and regulation of precisely defined "archaeological re-
sources." 3 6 Furthermore, the Act increases the number of actions
considered to be illegal and upgrades the criminal sanctions avail-
able through the judicial system.' 37 Finally, the Act recognizes the
Past, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1990, at 58 (describing methods and impact of pothunters); see also
Plundering Our Heritage, ART NEWS, Summer 1975, at 30-31 (indicating extensive presence of
pothunters who plunder Native American artifacts).
133. See The Plunder of the Past, supra note 132, at 58 (indicating that skyrocketing value of
Native American artifacts has contributed to increase in illegal collecting). The article notes
that "what was once a rural hobby has lately blossomed into a multimillion-dollar industry...
[s]purred [onward] by the five-figure prices the most prized artifacts can fetch." Id
134. Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 431-433 (1988)).
135. Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management.- Protecting
Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 17 (1982).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1988). The text provides:
The term "archaeological resource" means any material remains of past human life
or activities which are of archaeological interest, as determined under uniform regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to this chapter. Such regulations containing such de-
termination shall include, but not be limited to: pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons,
weapon projectiles, tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paint-
ings, rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials, or any portion or
piece of any of the foregoing items. Nonfossilized and fossilized paleontological
specimens, or any portion or piece thereof, shall not be considered archaeological
resources, under the regulations under this paragraph, unless found in archaeologi-
cal context. No item shall be treated as an archaeological resource under regulations
under this paragraph unless such item is at least 100 years of age.
Id.
The precise language in this section demonstrates Congress' intent to obviate a void for
vagueness holding similar to the one in Diaz. See supra note 128 (discussing failure of Antiqui-
ties Act to prevent looting because terms defined too loosely).
137. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988) (prohibiting appropriation and destruction of his-
toric or prehistoric ruins and monuments and objects of antiquity situated on public lands;
punishing violations with fine of not more than $500 and/or imprisonment of not more than
90 days) with 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee-470ff (1988) (prohibiting appropriation, destruction, and
trafficking of broadly defined "archaeological resources"; punishing criminal violations with
fine of not more than $10,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than one year; delineating
higher penalties for repeat offenses and especially egregious damage; providing for civil pen-
alties as well as criminal sanctions).
Like the Antiquities Act, the Archaeological Resource Protection Act prohibits the unau-
thorized removal, damage, alteration, or defacement of archaeological resources. 16 U.S.C.
§ 470ee(a) (1988). Unlike its predecessor, the Act expressly prohibits trafficking of wrong-
fully-obtained archaeological resources in interstate or foreign commerce. 16 U.S.C.
§ 470ee(c) (1988). The criminal penalties, under ordinary circumstances, include a fine of not
more than $10,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than one year. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d)
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Native Americans' right to maintain possession and control of cul-
turally important objects. 18 8 Despite this marked improvement in
American societal awareness regarding Native Americans' right to
control their cultural heritage, the Archaeological Resources Protec-
tion Act, like the Antiquities Act before it, fails to address the need
for the repatriation of those Native American cultural resources al-
ready in the collections of museums.139
C. National Museum of the American Indian Act
As the title of the Museum Act suggests, the legislation mandates
the establishment of a museum dedicated to Native American cul-
ture. 40 More importantly, the Act permits repatriation of a nar-
rowly defined group of cultural items in the collection of the
(1988). As the seriousness of the offense increases, however, so does the authority of the
court to grant a more weighty penalty. Id. Although these penalties are considerably more
potent than those authorized by the Antiquities Act, enforcement is inadequate. See Goodwin,
Raiders of the Sacred Sites, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 66 (suggesting lack of
funds and manpower as reasons for inadequate enforcement). See also Kane, The Big-And
Illegal-Business ofIndian Artifacts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1986, at F13, col. I (emphasizing that
only handful of agents are responsible for patrolling millions of acres of land). For example,
in New Mexico there are two agents responsible for eleven million acres of federally managed
land, while six agents are responsible for the combined twenty-two million acres of Forest
Service land in Arizona and New Mexico. Ia at F13, col. 3. The Forest Service has made only
forty arrests in Arizona and New Mexico since 1979, and only one has resulted in a jail sen-
tence. Id at F13, col. 4. Consequently, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act has
failed to halt the looting and trafficking of Indian archaeological resources and, consequently,
a multi-million dollar industry is thriving. See it at F13, col. 1 (reporting that theft of antiqui-
ties is lucrative business).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 470dd (1988). The 1979 Act embodied a developing recognition of the
needs of Native Americans, specifying that if there is a possibility that an excavation or schol-
arly study located on public land and commenced pursuant to a valid permit might result in
the harm or destruction of a cultural or religious site, the appropriate Indian tribe must be
notified. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (1988). In addition, an individual or organization wishing to
excavate or to remove objects from Indian land must first obtain the consent of the Indian or
Indian tribe possessing legal authority over the land. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(2) (1988). The
conditions and restrictions imposed upon the party by the appropriate Indian authority must
be strictly followed. Ld. Finally, the Act recognizes that the Indian or Indian tribe with juris-
diction over the lands upon which the excavation occurs, maintains the final authority con-
cering the ultimate disposition of removed objects. 16 U.S.C. § 470dd (1988).
139. Cf 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470gg (1988) (containing no provision for repatriation of
Native American cultural artifacts held by museums and scientific institutions).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-l(a) (Supp. 11989). The museum is established within the Smithso-
nian Institution. Id It will be supervised by a 25-member board of trustees. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-
3(e)(l) (Supp. 1 1989). Initially, 7 trustees must be Native Americans. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-
3(e)(2) (Supp. 11989). Eventually 12 of the 25 trustees must be Native Americans. 20 U.S.C.
§ 80q-3(O(2) (Supp. 1 1989).
The Museum Act also authorizes transfer of the assets of the Heye Foundation to the new
museum. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-2 (Supp. 1 1989). The Heye Foundation's Museum of the Ameri-
can Indian in New York City has "an unequaled assemblage of more than 1,000,000 Indian art
objects and artifacts and is one of the largest ... collections in the world." S. REP. No. 143,
101st Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1989). The merger of the Heye Foundation collection with the
collection of the Smithsonian Institution creates "an institution whose capabilities for exhibi-
tion and research [are] unrivaled in scope." Id.
19921
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Smithsonian Institution. 14 1 Although the scope of the Act is lim-
ited,1 42 Congress' mere recognition of a Native American repatria-
tion right is a significant advancement toward the ultimate goal of
complete repatriation.
The Museum Act defines a two-stage repatriation process. The
first stage requires the Smithsonian Institution to create an inven-
tory of those items deemed to be funerary objects, including objects
associated with the burial of an individual or those removed from a
specific burial site. 143 The second stage requires that a "preponder-
ance of the evidence" point to a specific cultural affiliation before
Native American parties may recover their desired cultural
property. 44
The creation of a museum inventory is an integral element of the
repatriation process. The inventory defines the cultural origin of
the museum-held property, and as a result identifies the class of per-
sons who may request repatriation of those items.' 45 Because of the
importance of the inventory process, the Act creates a complex
mechanism to ensure its efficient completion and impartial manage-
ment. The Act encourages efficiency by requiring museums to em-
ploy the most accurate tools available to discover the correct
cultural affiliation of objects.' 4 6 It also promotes impartiality by cre-
ating a supervisory committee in which Native American interests
are adequately represented. 47
141. See 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9 (Supp. 11989) (requiring Smithsonian Institution to inventory,
notify, and expeditiously return Indian artifacts traceable to specific persons or tribes). The
Smithsonian Institution is chartered under the executive branch and the ChiefJustice of the
Supreme Court. 20 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. 11989). The Smithsonian is governed by a 17-person
Board of Regents, composed of the Vice President, the ChiefJustice, three members of the
Senate, three members of the House of Representatives, and nine other persons. 20 U.S.C.
§ 42 (Supp. 1 1989). The Smithsonian's authority to obtain and keep cultural remains comes
from its general charter to "increase" and "diffus[e]" knowledge, 20 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. I
1989), and specifically from its broad authorization to continue "the excavation and preserva-
tion of archaeological remains." 20 U.S.C. § 69 (Supp. 1 1989). Section 69 of the Museum
Act was passed April 10, 1928 and amended August 22, 1949 "to give permanent statutory
authorization to activities of the Smithsonian Institution which have been carried on with con-
tinuous congressional approval for upwards of 70 years." H. REP. No. 1055, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, repnnted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1841, 1841.
142. See 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(a) (Supp. 1 1989) (allowing inventory of human remains and
funerary objects but not of sacred objects of cultural patrimony).
143. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9 (Supp. 1 1989).
144. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(b)-(d) (Supp. 1 1989).
145. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(a) (Supp. 1 1989).
146. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(a)(2) (Supp. 1 1989).
147. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-10(b) (Supp. 11989). The inventory is to be completed in consulta-
tion and cooperation with Indian representatives. Id. This is to be accomplished by the estab-
lishment of a special committee to monitor the inventory process and resolve disputes
between competing interest groups. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-10(a) (Supp. 1 1989). The committee
consists of five members; three members are appointed from a list of individuals submitted by
Native American tribes and organizations. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-10(b) (Supp. 1 1989). To avoid
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The second stage of the repatriation process prescribes the level
of proof needed for repatriation as well as the compulsory proce-
dures for any exchange of cultural artifacts.148 If the inventory pro-
cess permits experts to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that an item has a specific cultural affiliation, then the sec-
retary of the supervisory committee notifies the associated Native
American tribe, association, or individual of the finding.' 49 At this
point, the affiliated Native America party may request the return of
the item in question. 150 If the individual or group asserts its right to
the object, the Smithsonian Institution must expeditiously facilitate
the object's return1 51
D. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
The Museum Act established precedent for the return of Native
American funerary objects and remains from the Smithsonian Insti-
tution to the Native American community. 52 The Repatriation Act
logically continues the repatriation policy initiated by the Museum
Act. 155 The Repatriation Act, however, represents Congress' most
prodigious effort to return Native American cultural property.
While the Museum Act reaches only the Smithsonian Institution, 54
the Repatriation Act affects all museums'5 5 that receive federal
funding, except for the Smithsonian.' 56 Furthermore, the terms of
the Act expand the categories of objects available for repatriation.
The Repatriation Act defines four categories of "returnable" ob-
jects: associated funerary objects, unassociated funerary objects, sa-
cred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony.' 57 The precision of
the categories, as well as the clear language composing their defini-
conflicts of interest, none of those appointed to the committee can be a government employee
or affiliated in any way with the Smithsonian Institution. Id
148. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(b)-(d) (Supp. 1 1989).
149. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(b) (Supp. I 1989).
150. 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(c)-(d) (Supp. 1 1989).
151. Il
152. See supra note 141 (explaining limited repossession rights awarded Native Americans
in Museum Act).
153. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,175 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Akaka) (stat-
ing that Repatriation Act is "next step" in returning museum-held artifacts to native
homelands).
154. See 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9 (Supp. 1 1989) (limiting applicability of law to Smithsonian
Institution only).
155. Repatriation Act, § 2(8), 104 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3001). "'[M]useum' means any institution or State or local government agency (including
any institution of higher learning) that receives Federal funds and has possession of, or con-
trol over, Native American cultural items. Such term does not include the Smithsonian Insti-
tution or any other Federal agency." Id.
156. lId
157. See supra note 7 (defining categories of returnable objects).
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tions, is intended to eliminate grey areas that could cause the
problems of vagueness experienced by the Antiquities Act. 158 De-
spite the detailed wording of the Repatriation Act, the definitions
are surprisingly inclusive, granting wide latitude to what is covered
under the Act.159
Although the repatriation mechanism is similar in form to the one
contained in the Museum Act, 160 the extension of the types of items
available for repatriation requires the Repatriation Act to vary its
procedure. The Act dictates that each museum conduct an inven-
tory of those objects classified as associated funerary objects.16'
158. See supra note 128 (addressing treatment of Antiquities Act in United States v. Diaz
which held Antiquities Act to be "unconstitutionally vague").
159. See Repatriation Act, § 2(3), 104 Stat. 3048, 3048-49 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3001) (articulating broad definitions of associated funerary object, unassociated
funerary object, sacred object, and object of cultural patrimony). The Repatriation Act, like
the Museum Act, includes human remains as items which may be repatriated under this legis-
lation. Id. The issues surrounding the repatriation of human remains, however, are not the
focus of this comment, and therefore are not included in the textual discussion.
160. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (detailing Museum Act's repatriation
process).
161. Repatriation Act, § 5, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052-53 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.§ 3003). The text of section 5 (Inventory for Human Remains and Associated Funerary ob-
jects) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Each Federal agency and each museum which has possession or
control over holdings or collections of Native American human remains and associ-
ated funerary objects shall compile an inventory of such items and, to the extent
possible based on information possessed by such museum or Federal agency, iden-
tify the geographical and cultural affiliation of such item.
(b) REQUIREMENTS.-(1) The inventories and identifications required under subsec-
tion (a) shall be-
(A) completed in consultation with tribal government and Native Hawaiian or-
ganization officials and traditional religious leaders;
(B) completed by not later than the date that is 5 years after the date of enact-
ment of this Act, and
(C) made available both during the time they are being conducted and afterward
to a review committee established under section 8.
(2) Upon request by an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization which re-
ceives or should have received notice, a museum or Federal agency shall supply addi-
tional available documentation to supplement the information required by
subsection (a) of this section. The term "documentation" means a summary of ex-
isting museum or Federal agency records, including inventories or catalogues, rele-
vant studies, or other pertinent data for the limited purpose of determining the
geographical origin, cultural affiliation, and basic facts surrounding acquisition and
accession of Native American human remains and associated funerary objects subject
to this section. Such term does not mean, and this Act shall not be construed to be
an authorization for, the initiation of new scientific studies of such remains and asso-
ciated funerary objects or other means of acquiring or preserving additional scien-
tific information from such remains and objects.
(c) EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INVENToRY.-Any museum which has made a good faith ef-
fort to carry out an inventory and identification under this section, but which has been
unable to complete the process, may appeal to the Secretary for an extension of the time
requirements set forth in subsection (b)(l)(B). The Secretary may extend such time re-
quirements for any such museum upon a finding of good faith effort. An indicrzion of
good faith shall include the development of a plan to carry out the inventory and identifi-
cation process.
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During the inventory process, the museum must identify the geo-
graphic origin as well as the cultural affiliation of the objects. 162 It
does not require museums to inventory unassociated funerary ob-
jects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony. Rather, for
these objects, the museum is obliged to provide only a written sum-
mary based on available information. 163
Once the cultural affiliation of an associated burial object is deter-
mined, the museum notifies the appropriate Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization of the existence of the object. 164 When unas-
sociated burial objects, sacred objects and objects of cultural patri-
Id
162. Repatriation Act, § 5(a), 104 Stat. 3048, 3052 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3003). Cultural affiliation in the context of the Repatriation Act "means that there is a
relationship of a shared group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehis-
torically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifi-
able earlier group." Repatriation Act, § 2(2), 104 Stat. 3048, 3048 (1990) (to be codified at
25 U.S.C. § 3001).
163. Repatriation Act, § 6, 104 Stat. 3048, 3053-54 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3004). The text of section 6 (Summary for Unassociated Funerary Objects, Sacred Objects,
and Cultural Patrimony) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Each Federal agency or museum which has possession or control
over holdings or collections of Native American unassociated funerary objects, sa-
cred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony shall provide a written summary of
such objects based upon available information held by such agency or museum. The
summary shall describe the scope of the collection, kinds of objects included, refer-
ence to geographical location, means and period of acquisition and cultural affilia-
tion, where really ascertainable.
(b) REQUIREMENTrS.-(1) The summary required under subsection (a) shall be-
(A) in lieu of an object-by-object inventory;
(B) followed by consultation with tribal government and Native Hawaiian organ-
ization officials and traditional religious leaders; and
(C) completed by not later than the date that is 3 years after the date of enact-
ment of this Act.
Ide
164. Repatriation Act, § 5(d), 104 Stat. 3048, 3053 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3003). The text provides:
(d) NOTIFICATION.-(1) If the cultural affiliation of any particular Native American
human remains or associated funerary objects is determined pursuant to this section,
the Federal agency or museum concerned shall, not later than 6 months after the
completion of the inventory, notify the affected Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian or-
ganizations.
(2) The notice required by paragraph (1) shall include information -
(A) which identifies each Native American human remains or associated funerary
object and the circumstances surrounding its acquisition;
(B) which lists the human remains or associated funerary objects that are clearly
identifiable as to tribal origin; and
(C) which lists the Native American human remains and associated funerary ob-
jects that are not clearly identifiable as being culturally affiliated with that
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization, but which, given the totality of
circumstances surrounding acquisition of the remains or objects, are deter-
mined by a reasonable belief to be remains or objects culturally affiliated
with the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization.
(3) A copy of each notice provided under paragraph (1) shall be sent to the Secre-
tary who shall publish each notice in the Federal Register.
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mony are the subjects of summary investigation, notification is not
compulsory. 165 In such cases, interested parties must gain informa-
tion concerning the object from the summaries completed by the
museums. 16 6 If an interested Native American group or individual
requests the repatriation of a culturally affiliated object, the object
must be expeditiously returned.167
After completion of the inventory process by the museum, associ-
ated funerary objects and unassociated funerary objects, whose cul-
tural affiliation has not been satisfactorily determined, may be
subject to repatriation.16 8 In these situations, the Act obliges inter-
ested Native American tribes or individuals to proffer evidence es-
165. See id (requiring notice for human remains and associated funerary objects only).
For other items, a consultation with the tribal government is held after the summarization is
completed. Repatriation Act, § 6(b)(1)(B), 104 Stat. 3048, 3053 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3004).
166. Repatriation Act, § 6(b)(2), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3004). The text provides:
Upon request, Indian Tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations shall have access to
records, catalogues, relevant studies or other pertinent data for the limited purposes
of determining the geographic origin, cultural affiliation, and basic facts surrounding
acquisition and accession of Native American objects subject to this section. Such
information shall be provided in a reasonable manner to be agreed upon by all
parties.
Id
167. Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(I)-(3), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3005). The text of section 7 (Repatriation) provides:
(a) REPATRIATION OF NATIVE AMERICAN HUMAN REMAINS AND OBJECTS POSSESSED
OR CONTROLLED By FEDERAL AGENCIES AND MUSUEMS.-
(1) If, pursuant to section 5, the cultural affiliation of Native American human re-
mains and associated funerary objects with a particular Indian tribe or Native Hawai-
ian organization is established, then the Federal agency or museum, upon the
request of a known lineal descendant of the Native American or of the tribe or organ-
ization and pursuant to subsections (b) and (e) of this section, shall expeditiously
return such remains and associated funerary objects.
(2) If, pursuant to section 6, the cultural affiliation with a particular Indian tribe or
Native Hawaiian organization is shown with respect to unassociated funerary objects,
sacred objects or objects of cultural patrimony, then the Federal agency or museum,
upon the request of the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and pursuant
to subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this section, shall expeditiously return such objects.
(3) The return of cultural items covered by this Act shall be in consultation with
the requesting lineal descendant or tribe or organization to determine the place and
manner of delivery of such items.
Id.
168. Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(4), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3005). The text provides in part:
(4) Where cultural affiliation of Native American human remains and funerary ob-
jects has not been established in an inventory prepared pursuant to section 5, or the
summary pursuant to section 6, or where Native American human remains and fune-
rary objects are not included upon any such inventory, then, upon request and pur-
suant to subsections (b) and (e) and, in the case of unassociated funerary objects,
subsection (c), such Native American human remains and funerary objects shall be
expeditiously returned where the requesting Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organi-
zation can show cultural affiliation ....
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tablishing cultural affiliation. 169  Parties must prove cultural
affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence. 170 The evidence
presented to satisfy the burden of persuasion may be based on "ge-
ographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological, lin-
guistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical, other relevant
information, or expert opinion."' 7' Once the burden of persuasion
is satisfied, the Native American claimant must produce evidence
which "standing alone before the introduction of evidence to the
contrary, would support a finding that the... museum did not have
a right to possession."' 172 The museum is then given an opportunity
to rebut the Native American presentation.17 3 If the rebuttal over-
comes the evidence given by the Native American claimant, by prov-
ing the museum has a right of possession to the object, the museum
retains the object. 174
When sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony are not
identified as culturally-affiliated items, the burden of proving affilia-
tion also rests on the interested Native American party.' 75 The Na-
tive American party must establish one of three elements. 176 The
Native American party requesting the object may prove "direct lin-
eal descent."' 77 In other words, the party claiming the object must
be a descendant of the individual who previously owned the sacred
object or object of cultural patrimony. 78 The tribe, organization,
or individual may also prove that it previously owned or controlled
169. Id
170. Id.
171. Idt
172. Repatriation Act, § 7(c), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3005).
173. lId
174. Il
175. Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(5)(B), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3005).
176. See Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(5), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054-55 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3005) (enumerating requirements Native Americans must meet to prove cultural af-
filiation to unassociated items). The text provides:
(5) Upon request and pursuant to subsections (b), (c), and (e), sacred objects and
objects of cultural patrimony shall be expeditiously returned where -
(A) the requesting party is the direct lineal descendant of an individual who
owned the sacred object;
(B) the requesting Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization can show that
the object was owned or controlled by the tribe or organization; or
(C) the requesting Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization can show that
the sacred object was owned or controlled by a member thereof, provided
that in the case where a sacred object was owned by a member thereof, there
are no identifiable lineal descendants of said member or the lineal descend-
ants, upon notice, have failed to make a claim for the object under this Act.
Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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the item. 179 Finally, the requesting Indian tribe or Hawaiian organi-
zation may show that the object was owned by a member thereof,
and that no lineal descendant survives or desires to make a claim. 18 0
Unlike the procedure outlined for the return of culturally unaffili-
ated funerary objects, the quantity of evidence required to satisfy
the initial burden of persuasion for unaffiliated sacred objects and
objects of cultural patrimony is conspicuously absent.' 8 1 If, how-
ever, the Native American party provides adequate evidence in the
initial showing, he or she bears the burden of producing evidence
that the museum does not have a right to possession. 182 Just as with
culturally unaffiliated funerary objects, the museum is given the op-
portunity to rebut and prove a valid right of possession to the ob-
ject.183 A successful rebuttal results in the continuing possession of
the object by the museum.18 4
Generally, the establishment of cultural affiliation through the in-
ventory process, the summary investigation, or the presentation of
evidence by the Native American party, results in the expeditious
transfer of the affiliated object.' 8 5 Repatriation of the object, how-
ever, may still be stopped. If the item is considered indispensable
for the completion of a specific scientific study whose outcome
would significantly benefit the United States, the museum retains
possession of the object.'8 6
The Repatriation Act, like the Museum Act, establishes a review
committee. 187 The duty of the committee is to monitor and review
the inventory and repatriation processes, ensuring fair and efficient
179. Id
180. Id
181. I.
182. Repatriation Act, § 7(c), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3005).
183. Id.
184. Id
185. See supra note 167 (setting forth "expeditious return" language of Repatriation Act).
186. Repatriation Act, § 7(b), 104 Stat. 3048, 3055 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3005). Such items, however, "shall be returned by no later than 90 days after the date on
which the scientific study is completed." Id.
187. See Repatriation Act, § 8(a), 104 Stat. 3048, 3055 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3006) (requiring Secretary of Interior to establish committee within 120 days of enactment
of Repatriation Act). The committee will be composed of seven members. Id. § 8(b). The
text provides as follows:
(A) 3 [members] shall be appointed by the Secretary from nominations submit-
ted by Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations, and traditional Native
American religious leaders with at least 2 of such persons being traditional
Indian religious leaders;
(B) 3 [members] shall be appointed by the Secretary from nominations submit-
ted by national museum organizations and scientific organizations; and
(C) 1 [member] shall be appointed by the Secretary from a list of persons devel-
oped and consented to by all of the members appointed pursuant to subpar-
agraphs (A) and (B).
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application of the Act.188 Unlike its predecessor, however, the Re-
patriation Act contains an effective enforcement mechanism. The
enforcement mechanism provides federal courts with jurisdiction
over disputes arising under the Act. 189 It also grants federal courts
the power to issue orders deemed necessary to enforce the terms of
the legislation. 190
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The extensive treatment given to the repatriation issue in the Re-
patriation Act increases the rights of Native Americans to recover
cultural items held by museums. 191 The Act may be viewed as the
culmination of years of effort by Native Americans to initiate a pro-
cess facilitating the return of Native American cultural resources. . 92
The Repatriation Act, however, is a compromise that strikes a bal-
ance between the competing interests of Native Americans, muse-
ums, and interested private parties. 93 When Native American
negotiators confronted the staunch resistance of the American Asso-
(2) The secretary may not appoint Federal officers or employees to the committee.
Id.
188. Repatriation Act, § 8(c), 104 Stat. 3048, 3056 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3006). The text provides:
(c) RESPONSIBILrIES.-The committee established under section (a) shall be respon-
sible for-
(2) monitoring the inventory process and identification process conducted under
sections 5 and 6 to ensure a fair, objective consideration and assessment of all avail-
able relevant information and evidence;
(3) upon the request of any affected party, reviewing and making findings related
to -
(A) the identity or cultural affiliation of cultural items, or
(B) the return of such items;
(4) facilitating the resolution of any disputes among Indian tribes, Native Hawai-
ian organizations, or lineal descendants and Federal agencies or museums relating to
the return of such items including convening the parties to the dispute if deemed
desirable....
ME
189. Repatriation Act, § 15, 104 Stat. 3048, 3058 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3013).
190. lId
191. See supra notes 168-90 and accompanying text (analyzing repatriation mechanism of
Repatriation Act).
192. See supra notes 110-51 and accompanying text (discussing development of laws gov-
erning disposition of Native American cultural items prior to enactment of Repatriation Act).
193. See 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richard-
son) (noting that numerous suggestions by Antique Tribal Arts Dealers Association, Inc.
(ATADA) were incorporated into final draft of Repatriation Act).
First, ATADA recommended that the Act include a definition of "cultural affiliation" that
incorporated anthropological and archaeological criteria. Id. The Repatriation Act defines
"cultural affiliation" as "a relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonably
traced historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization and an identifiable earlier group." Repatriation Act, § 2(2), 104 Stat. 3048, 3048
(1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001). The Act thus attempts to correlate the cultural or
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ciation of Museums and the Antique Tribal Art Dealers Association,
anthropological characteristics of a present day group with the archaeological past as sug-
gested by ATADA.
ATADA also requested the modification of the definition of "inalienable communal prop-
erty." See 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson);
House Hearings, supra note 12, at 3 (statement ofJames Reid, Antique Tribal Art Dealers Asso-
ciation, Inc., and Sotheby's, Inc.). The interest group suggested two changes that were incor-
porated into the final version of the Act. 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Richardson). First, "that the object be of 'ongoing' cultural importance,"
and second, "that the object must be deemed inalienable at the time [of] it[s] expatriation."
Id.
In addition, ATADA asked the definition of "museum" be narrowed to prevent the defini-
tion as in earlier versions of the Act, from including private individuals who receive grants or
payments such as social security. Id The expansive language would have potentially included
many other collectors and dealers within the scope of the bill. Id. Consequently, the defini-
tion of "museum" was narrowed to include only institutions or state or local agencies that
receive federal funds. Repatriation Act, § 2(8), 104 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1990) (to be codified at
25 U.S.C. § 3001) (defining meaning of term).
Furthermore, ATADA was concerned that the definition of "sacred object" was so broad as
to be unworkable. 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Richardson); House Hearings, supra note 12, at 240-43 (statement ofJames Reid, Antique and
Tribal Art Dealers Association, Inc. and Sotheby's, Inc.). The organization suggested, as an
alternative, that the definition "stipulate that the object need be 'irreplaceable' and 'necessary
for the continued practice' of tribal religions." 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson). The final draft of the Repatriation Act adopted only
the latter suggestion. Repatriation Act, § 2(3)(C), 104 Stat. 3048, 3048 (1990) (to be codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 3001). The term "irreplaceable" was not added to the definition because of
continued Native American protest that the courts not determine what is essential or "irre-
placeable" for the practice of a Native American religion. 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
Congress also modified the definition of "funerary object" in response to ATADA's de-
mands. Id at H10,991. The term was divided into two categories, associated funerary objects
and unassociated funerary objects. Repatriation Act, § 2(3)(A)-(B), 104 Stat. 3048, 3048
(1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001). This was to "provide greater specificity to the
objects covered by the bill." 136 CONG. REC. H10,991 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Richardson). Further, as a result of ATADA pressure, the Act contains a clause stipulat-
ing that the legislation shall not supersede the right of possession established under property
law. 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
ATADA expressed concern that the bill's original inventory requirements would pose
overly-burdensome financial and bureaucratic burdens on museums. Id at H10,990. Conse-
quently, the Repatriation Act includes "specific simplified inventory requirements and autho-
rizes a Federal grant program to assist museums in their inventory activities." Id. ATADA
and the museum community supported the simplified inventory. Id
In the Repatriation Act debate, ATADA aligned itself with the American Association of
Museums (AAM). Id. This is an unusual circumstance because, generally, the divergent goals
of museums and private collectors result in conflict between the two groups. ATADA sup-
ports private collection and private viewing of artistic objects. House Hearings, supra note 12, at
238 (statement of James Reid, Antique Tribal Art Dealers Association, Inc. and Sotheby's,
Inc.). Museums, on the other hand, stand for public viewing and public education; their phi-
losophy is that art should be available for all to see. See id. (statement of Dr. Raymond
Thompson, American Association of Museums) (discussing unique role of museums in fur-
thering public education and research).
Congress also modified the burden of proof requirement of the Repatriation Act to accom-
modate the strong objections of ATADA and the AAM. 136 CONG. REC. H10,990-91 (daily
ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson). The original provisions of the bill placed
the burden of proving ownership of objects on the museum or agency in possession. H.R.
5237, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(c)(1) (1990). The revised and subsequently enacted version
shifts the burden of proof of ownership to the Native American or Hawaiian organizations on
all cultural items except associated funerary objects. Repatriation Act, § 7, 104 Stat. 3048,
3054-55 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3005). The composition of the review commit-
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they dropped important demands and accepted the political reality
of their situation. As a result, additional legislation is needed to
fully address Native American concerns regarding the disposition of
their cultural legacy.' 94
While the Repatriation Act reaches federally-funded museums as
well as federal agencies, the Smithsonian Institution remains un-
governed by the Act. 195 Presently, the Smithsonian Institution pos-
sesses the largest Native American collection in the world.' 96 To
purposefully exempt the Smithsonian from the comprehensive re-
quirements of the Repatriation Act and subject it only to the more
permissive requirements of the Museum Act, 197 decreases the effec-
tiveness of the legislation. Furthermore, it weakens the bonds of the
"unique relationship"198 existing between the Federal Government
and the Native Americans. Finally, the failure to include the Smith-
sonian Institution within the scope of the Repatriation Act brings
into question the United States government's commitment to re-
dressing the historical wrong committed against the Native Ameri-
can population.
tee was also modified at the request of ATADA and the AAM. 136 CONG. REC. HIO,990 (daily
ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson). The two interest groups "raised concerns
that the representation of the review committee established by the Act was weighted in favor
of Native American groups." Id The present version of the Repatriation Act strikes a more
favorable balance. The seven member board, appointed by the Secretary, is composed of
three members nominated by the Native American community and three members nominated
by the museum and scientific community. Repatriation Act, § 8(b)(1)(A)-(C), 104 Stat. 3048,
3055 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3006). The final member is appointed from a list
developed and approved by the six existing committee members. Id
194. See infra notes 195-231 (discussing potential loopholes in Repatriation Act and
problems with burden of proof standard imposed on Native American claimants).
195. See Repatriation Act, § 2(4), (8), 104 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1990) (excluding Smithsonian
Institution from definitions of "federal agency" and "museum"); 136 CONG. REC. S17,174
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Breaux) (amending Act to specifically exclude
Smithsonian Institution).
196. 20 U.S.C. § 80q(5)(A) (Supp. 1 1989) (asserting that merger of Smithsonian collec-
tion with Heye collection would "create a national institution with unrivaled capability for
exhibition and research").
197. See 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(c)-(d) (Supp. 11989) (providing for repatriation of only Native
American human remains, associated funerary objects, and unassociated funerary objects).
The Museum Act is silent regarding sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony and
therefore, at least with respect to these items, the Repatriation Act may effectuate repatriation
of greater numbers of artifacts. Id.
On March 4, 1991, the National Museum of the American Indian announced a new policy
on repatriation. Smithsonian Institution, Press Release No. SI-121-91 (Mar. 5, 1991). The
policy expands the repatriation principles of the Museum Act to include "ceremonial and
religious materials and communally owned Native Property," and creates six categories of
items. Id. at Al. This expansion is an improvement over the Museum and Repatriation Acts,
but the policy still falls short. Repatriation decisions will be made by the museum's board of
trustees "on advice" of the collection committee. Id. at A2. Furthermore, the party request-
ing the return of an item bears the initial burden of establishing a connection or cultural
affiliation to the object. Id.
198. Repatriation Act, § 12, 104 Stat. 3048, 3058 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3010).
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A second difficulty with the Repatriation Act can be found in the
provision concerning scientific study. The provision requires that a
federal agency or museum promptly return a requested item, unless
the item is needed for the completion of a scientific study that signif-
icantly benefits the United States.199 The wording of the provision
is vague, and thus invites abuse by those institutions receiving Na-
tive American requests for repatriation. The language neither
clearly specifies what should be classified as indispensable to scien-
tific research nor indicates exactly what research results in a major
benefit to the United States. 200 Under the terms of the Act, any
agency or museum receiving a request for repatriation could initiate
a scientific study that it defines as vital to the United States and then
schedule the study's completion date in the distant future. This un-
ethical course of action would comply with the terms of the Act, and
at the same time, eliminate a valid claim for repatriation.
To be more effective, the Repatriation Act should prohibit the
unilateral initiation of new research projects involving disputed ma-
terial. A bilateral mechanism that fosters negotiation between the
museums and the Native Americans must be designed and permit-
ted to operate. 20 1 This would allow the interests of all those in-
volved to be taken into consideration.202 For instance, legislation
could require the institution to obtain the consent of the culturally
affiliated tribe or individual before any scientific project commences.
Reservations or objections noted by the Native American party
could be discussed and appropriate action to remedy the problems
could be guaranteed. Only upon the mutual agreement of the par-
ties could the research project proceed. If the parties are unable to
199. Repatriation Act, § 7(b), 104 Stat. 3048, 3055 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3005). The provision on scientific study states in its entirety:
If the lineal descendant, Indian tribe, or Native Hawaiian organization requests the
return of culturally affiliated Native American cultural items, the Federal agency or
museum shall expeditiously return such items unless such items are indispensable
for completion of a specific scientific study, the outcome of which would be of major
benefit to the United States. Such items shall be returned by no later than 90 days
after the date on which the scientific study is completed.
200. Id. The definition section of the Act also fails to illuminate the meanings of "indis-
pensable" and "major benefit." Repatriation Act, § 2, 104 Stat. 3048, 3048-50 (1990) (to be
codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001).
201. See Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493,495 (1989) (not-
ing dominance of negotiation as problem solving and dispute resolution device). Negotiation
is uniquely suited to resolving all types of issues and it is a key element both in dispute resolu-
tion and in consensus building. Id. The term "negotiating" refers to "stylized reciprocal
dealings, which are initiated, conducted, and monitored by the parties, and are intended to
resolve a dispute or to reach an agreement concerning future actions." Id. at 494 n. 1.
202. See id. (highlighting that parties to negotiations directly control agenda and conse-
quently interests to be negotiated).
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arrive at a suitable agreement, the complaint could be submitted to
an alternative forum for dispute resolution.20 3
Future legislation should also place a limitation on the amount of
time permitted for the research of a particular question. This dead-
line should be final except upon a showing, substantiated by direct
evidence, 20 4 that research is proceeding at a satisfactory pace and
that its completion will lead to a significant benefit to the United
States. The institution involved must prove its case with clear and
convincing evidence. 20 5 Upon satisfying this burden of proof, an
extension period could be granted by the governing committee. If
the showing is insufficient, the materials subject to dispute should
be immediately returned to the appropriate Native American claim-
ant. The suggested mechanism strikes a balance between Native
American rights and the requirements of academic study. While it
provides Native Americans with an opportunity to recover their cul-
tural property, it also allows scholars to gain additional time for the
accurate and successful completion of legitimate academic research.
The Repatriation Act establishes an inventory system for associ-
ated funerary objects and a limited summary requirement for unas-
sociated funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of cultural
patrimony.20 6 The current scheme creates a system in which muse-
203. See Fine & Planger, ADR Overview, in CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 7, 7-11 (E. Fine ed. 1988) (stating that
increasing interest in alternative dispute resolution has resulted from mounting public dissat-
isfaction with formal dispute resolution process and institutions, particularly courts, to resolve
disputes in timely, efficient, and economic manner); Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 676-77 (1986) (arguing that alternative dispute
resolution methods may be inappropriate outside realm of purely private disputes and where
broader issues involving public law are at stake).
Traditional forms of alternative dispute resolution include adjudication, arbitration, media-
tion, and negotiation. E. Green, Remarks at the First Annual Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 20, 1983), reprinted in 100 F.R.D.
499, 518 (1984).
Less traditional forms of alternative dispute resolution include mini-trials, summary trial,
rent-a-judge, and neutral expert fact-finding. See id at 515-20 (discussing mini-trial in detail
and noting other nontraditional forms of alternative dispute resolution).
204. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338, at 952 (3d ed. E. Cleary ed.
1984) (stating that direct evidence permits individual making judgment to ascertain truth of
fact to be proved by depending only upon truthfulness of evidence provided and not weighing
of probabilities).
205. See idL § 340, at 959-60 (noting that clear and convincing should be translated to
mean highly probable); McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 246-
47, 253-54 (1944) (arguing that trier of facts can differentiate three levels of persuasion).
McBaine suggests that the trier of fact can determine "what (a) probably has happened, or (b)
what highly probably has happened, or (c) what almost certainly has happened." Id. (emphasis in
original). To satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard, the party seeking to establish the
fact should induce persuasion "to a relatively high degree." Id. at 253. Therefore, the propo-
nent must establish that the facts are highly probable. Id. at 254.
206. Repatriation Act, §§ 5-6, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052-54 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3003-3004);see 136 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 22, :990) (statement of Rep. Rich-
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ums could easily abuse their authority and act to the detriment of
the Native American community. It grants museums the discretion
to designate which items will receive the attention of the rigorous
inventory process and which will receive only summary treat-
ment.20 7 Items classified for inventory are more likely to be repatri-
ated than those designated for summary identification. 208
Consequently, museums could purposefully misdesignate items to
retain possession.
One viable solution to the difficulties inherent in the bifurcated
system is to create a single inventory process governed by a commis-
sion, as suggested in the original version of the Repatriation Act.209
All items would be subject to the same inventory requirements. 210
This would ensure that all objects, to the extent possible, are cor-
rectly identified. 21 1 Furthermore, it would minimize a museum's
ability to manipulate the system in its favor. A single system requir-
ing universal inventory processes would assure Native Americans
that their right to regain possession of cultural property is scrupu-
lously respected.
The Repatriation Act provides Native Americans with a greater
opportunity to recover cultural objects than if they were to initiate a
common law action in replevin in a court of law.2 12 This is particu-
larly true where the Native American party requests the repatriation
of a culturally affiliated object. Where the museum establishes cul-
tural affiliation pursuant to the inventory process, associated funer-
ary objects must be expeditiously returned, with no required
showing by the Native American.2 13 Furthermore, culturally affili-
ated unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of
cultural patrimony must be expeditiously returned, on the satisfac-
ardson) (stating that inventory process was not required of all items because legislators felt
requirements would pose great financial and bureaucratic burdens on museums).
207. Repatriation Act, §§ 5-6, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052-53 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3003-3004) (providing authority to museums to make crucial decisions concerning catego-
rization of cultural items).
208. See id (discussing burden of proof requirement for items which enter inventory pro.
cess and those which go through summary process).
209. See H.R. 5237, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 5(a), 7(b)(l) (1990) (creating single inven-
tory system overseen by committee composed of seven members, four ofwhom are appointed
by Secretary from nominations submitted by Native American tribes).
210. See ida at § 5(a) (proposing system that requires inventory of all human remains, fune-
rary objects, sacred objects, or objects of inalienable communal property in collections of
publicly funded museums).
211. Id. (requiring geographic and cultural identification of all objects, if possible).
212. Compare supra notes 153-90 and accompanying text (discussing Repatriation Act) with
supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text (discussing common law action in replevin).
213. See Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(1), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3005) (defining standards for repatriation of culturally affiliated associated funerary
objects).
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tion of a moderate burden of proof by the Native American. 214
There is, however, a vast class of objects labelled as culturally
unaffiliated. 215
As previously noted in the section detailing the Repatriation Act's
repatriation process, the burden of establishing the cultural affilia-
tion of those funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony, deemed culturally unaffiliated by the museum inventory
and summary procedures, rests on the Native American claimant.2 16
In regard to funerary objects, the party must prove cultural affilia-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence.21 7 When attempting to
prove the cultural affiliation of sacred objects and objects of cultural
patrimony, the burden is less clear. The Native American is obliged
to go forward with evidence proving either lineal descent or prior
ownership to establish cultural affiliation.2 18 The quantity of evi-
dence, however, needed to persuade the review committee is not
noted.21 9 From the context, it appears that the showing is
equivalent to a burden of persuasion.220 On the establishment of
cultural affiliation, all three types of objects necessitate that the Na-
tive American organization, tribe, or individual, produce evidence
that would support a finding that the museum does not have a right
to possess the object.22 '
The drafters of the Repatriation Act designed the legislation to
provide Native Americans with a process that would result in the
repatriation of their cultural heritage, address the needs and obliga-
tions of the museum community, and defuse tlie emotionally-
charged issue of repatriation.222 To accomplish these goals, the
above-mentioned process should be altered. Earlier versions of the
214. See Repatriation Act, §§ 7(a)(2), 7(c), 104 Star. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at
25 U.S.C. § 3005) (defining standards for repatriation of culturally affiliated unassociated
funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony).
215. See id § 7(a)(4), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3005)
(discussing repatriation process for culturally unaffiliated items); see also supra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text (discussing dubious means through which museums collected Native
American materials and resulting lack of information regarding precise origin of these items).
216. See supra notes 168-84 and accompanying text (discussing repatriation process of un-
affiliated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony).
217. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (listing evidence permitted to satisfy
burden).
218. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (detailing burden on Native Americans
wanting to recover specifically sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony).
219. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting absence of wording that defines
burden of persuasion).
220. Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(1)-(3), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3005); see supra note 167 (outlining text of § 7(a)(1)-(3)).
221. See Repatriation Act, § 7(a)(b), 104 Stat. 3048, 3054 (1990) (to be codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3005) (requiring satisfaction of section (c) prior to repatriation).
222. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,175 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(highlighting purposes and outcomes of Repatriation Act).
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Repatriation Act shift the burden of going forward and the burden
of persuasion to the museum.223 It requires the museum to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it has a right of possession
to the object in question.224 This drastic alteration of the process,
however, results in an unfair burden being placed on the museum
community. Any time a Native American requests an item stored or
displayed in a museum, the museum would be required to defend its
right to possession.
To avoid the harsh effects of a reversal of the burdens of produc-
tion and proof, and, at the same time, address the purposes of the
Repatriation Act, a system that places the initial burden on the Na-
tive Americans is necessary. Instead of a burden of persuasion, 22 5
the Native American claimant should be forced to satisfy a burden of
production. 226 Thus, the party would be required to show sufficient
evidence of cultural affiliation on which a reasonable jury could find
in his or her favor.227 On the satisfaction of this burden by the Na-
tive American party, the burden of going forward would be placed
on the museum. 228 The museum could proceed in one of two alter-
native manners. It could disprove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the cultural affiliation established by the Native American
individual, organization, or tribe, negating the party's or parties'
right to claim the object. The museum could also attempt to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, its legal right to maintain pos-
session of the object. This could be established by any type of docu-
mentation concerning the method of acquisition of the object. If
the museum proves the lack of cultural affiliation of the Native
American party to the object or a valid right of possession, the ob-
ject should remain in the museum's collection. If, on the other
hand, the museum fails to meet its required showing, the object in
question should be expeditiously repatriated.
Congress might also consider the insertion of a compromise op-
tion into the text of the Repatriation Act. Instead of an adversarial
223. See H.R. 5237, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990) (requiring initial showing by
museum).
224. See id. (detailing museum's burden of going forward and burden of persuasion).
225. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 204, § 339, at 956-59 (discussing satisfaction of bur-
den of persuasion). The "preponderance of the evidence" standard is the burden of persua-
sion generally employed in civil cases. Id. at 956.
226. See iL § 338, at 952-56 (discussing burden of producing evidence).
227. See id. at 953 (noting that "scintilla" of evidence is not enough but rather "the evi-
dence must be such that a reasonable man could draw from it the inference of the existence of
the particular fact to be proved...").
228. See id. at 955 (stating that when party satisfies burden of production, duty of going
forward has shifted to adversary); see also Speas v. Merchant & Bank Trust Co., 188 N.C. 524,
530, 125 S.E. 398, 401 (1924) (suggesting burden of going forward shifts to opponent).
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hearing, pitting the Native American against the museum, a forum
could be designated in which a cooperative discussion process could
occur.229 A panel consisting of representatives of the two interested
parties could be appointed to address the controversy surrounding
the repatriation of the cultrually unaffiliated funerary object, sacred
object, or object of cultural patrimony. The individuals involved in
this alternative process could consider a multiplicity of actions
which would bring partial satisfaction to all involved parties. 230 For
instance, a museum could retain physical possession of the object,
but the conditions under which the item is exhibited or stored could
be controlled by guidelines formed by the Native American party. A
situation such as the one posited above might permit the tribe to
remove the object from the museum's possession for a specified
number of days, weeks, or months to perform necessary religious
ceremonies. Similarly, the Native American party could retain phys-
ical possession of the object in question. In this case, scholars and
scientists might be permitted access to the objects so that research
could continue uninhibited. This type of compromise could also in-
clude short term loans to the museum, which would permit the mu-
seum to exhibit the object and fulfill its duty to the public.23'
CONCLUSION
As the United States matured into a nation that respected the
rights of minority groups, the Native American community suffered
and endured the loss of their lives, land, and property. Cultural ob-
jects, representing their heritage and identity, were wrested from
their control or stolen. Many of these items found their way into
museum collections. Until the passage of the Repatriation Act, the
Native Americans were unable to regain possession of many cultural
objects housed in our nation's museums. The courts of law, as well
as Congressional statutory efforts, failed to respond to Native Amer-
ican requests for repatriation. The Repatriation Act directly con-
fronts the issue and mandates the unprecedented return of
numerous Native American cultural items. Yet, the Act makes nu-
merous concessions to the American Museum Association and other
interested parties that reduce the effect of the legislation and im-
229. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (discussing potential and effectiveness
of negotiations in resolving disputes in context of Act's scientific research provision).
230. See supra notes 201-02 (noting that negotiation addresses concerns of both parties
and, if successful, results in agreement concerning future actions).
231. See Report of the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American Rela-
tions 13 (Feb. 28, 1990) (indicating important role of museums). Museums are in a fiduciary
relationship with public to "advance and disseminate knowledge through the acquisition,
preservation, study, and interpretation of collections." Id.
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pede the repatriation process. As a result, the Repatriation Act fails
to eliminate repatriation as an issue of contention.
Upon the successful resolution of the repatriation controversy,
the preservation, exhibition, and study of Native American cultural
objects will be controlled by the Native American community. With
the common identity and the cultural pride derived from the ob-
jects, Native Americans will be able to confront, more effectively,
the problems of the present and view, more positively, their role in
the future.
